

ISSN: 2525-0965

LANCO ANNUAL JOURNAL OF THE MASTER'S PROGRAM IN LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY LAI SU



THIRD ISSUE

A new imaginary



Universidad
Nacional
de Córdoba



FACULTAD DE
PSICOLOGIA



SECRETARIA DE
POSGRADO
Facultad de Psicología UNC



MATPsIL
MAESTRIA EN TEORÍA PSICOANALÍTICA LACANIANA

LAPSO

ANNUAL JOURNAL OF THE MASTER'S PROGRAM IN LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

LAPSO

EDITOR

Jorge Assef

Academic Coordinator of the **Program in Lacanian Psychoanalytic Theory**
jorgepabloassef@gmail.com

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Fabian Fanjwaks (Université Paris VIII)

Mariana Gómez (CIECS-CONICET)

Sergio Laia (FUMEC)

Juan Jorge Michel Fariña (UBA)

Christian Ríos (UNLP)

Inés Sotelo (UNSM)

Alejandro Willington (EOL)

EDITORIAL BOARD

María Agustina Brandi

(MaTPsiL Coordinator)

David González

Hernán Brizio

Eugenia Destéfanis

Leticia Perona

Lorena Beloso

Luciana Szrank

Marco Alfieri

Matías Meichtri

Sofía Kolic

TRANSLATION TEAM

David González

(Coordinator)

Eugenia Destéfanis

Leticia Perona

Luciana Szrank

Sofía Kolic

Gonzalo Zabala

DESIGN

Gonzalo Zabala

LAPSO is the academic magazine of the **Master's Program in Lacanian Psychoanalytic Theory** (MaTPsiL), School of Psychology, National University of Córdoba.

This is an annual magazine and its purpose is to publish, in Spanish and English versions, research articles, scientific communication, and original creations based on the theoretical framework of Lacanian-Oriented Psychoanalysis.

As it is expressed in the first editorial by Dr. Mariana Gómez, LAPSO constitutes "an effort of writing and rewriting psychoanalytic concepts and Lacan's teaching. This effort will seek to make those concepts pass through the University. However, its greatest challenge will be to achieve, from the space of a lapse, the production of a text in the reverse of the logic of the master, the teacher."

About the Master's Program in Lacanian Psychoanalytic Theory

In light of the vast permeation of the psychoanalytic conceptual corpus in the cultural and professional areas of our field, the Master's Program intends to create an academic environment that allows to address, elaborate on, and research Jacques Lacan's contributions to the theoretical foundations of Psychoanalysis and the interdisciplinary development in conversation with other areas where subjectivity unfolds.

While we are aware of the multiplicity of orientations derived from the psychoanalytic theory, even before the passing of its creator, Sigmund Freud, this academic proposal has a theoretical consistency basis that allows the cohesive articulation of the elements in a complex conceptual corpus, in which each notion is founded on and dialogues with its predecessors, and anticipates the future internal epistemological twists. For this reason, the Master's Program follows an orientation that pivots the crucial moments of the Lacanian teaching and expects students to build on that considering its ruptures and articulations. Therefore, taking these crucial moments of Lacan's teaching as a basis; on the one hand, the program addresses the concepts, axioms, and mathemes of the theory and; on the other hand, it approaches the changes these undergo over the course of the theoretical production.

ARBITRATION COMMITTEE

Margarita Álvarez Villanueva

Escuela Lacaniana de Psicoanálisis del Campo Freudiano, España.

Dalila Arpin

École de la Cause Freudienne, Francia.

Heloisa Caldas

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Oswaldo Delgado

Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Ana Cecilia González

CONICET

Diego Fonti

Universidad Católica de Córdoba.

Carolina Koretzky

Université Paris VIII, Francia.

Fabián Naparstek

Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Patricia Moraga

Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Luis Salamone

Universidad Kennedy.

Veronique Voruz

University of Leicester, Inglaterra.

Tomás Bondone

Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

Héctor García

Universitat de Barcelona, España

INDEX

EDITORIAL

05

A new imaginary
MARÍA AGUSTINA BRANDI

07

Having a Body: Some Clinical Consequences of Lacan's Late Teaching
ESTEBAN KLAINER

13

The Consistency of the Imaginary in Current Clinical Practice
GISELA SMANIA

18

Surveilled and Surveillant Subjects in the Society of Control
SONIA MANKOFF

23

Note on the Digitized Image
FABIÁN FAJNWAKS

27

New imaginary in *farmacopornographyc's* times
ROBERTO CORDERO

32

It is necessary to crash...
FLORENCIA MINA

LAPSO INTERVIEW

37

Video Interview
BABY NOVOTNY

INTERSECTIONS

38

The Body, Image Queen in the History of Art
MARCELO NUSENOVICH & DAVID ALBANO GONZÁLEZ

47

I don't like to talk about art
MARCOS LÓPEZ

A NEW IMAGINARY

MARÍA AGUSTINA BRANDI *

We must be broken, as I might say, into a new imaginary establishing meaning. (...) the meaning as such that I defined earlier of the copulation, in short, of language since it is from that that I support the unconscious: from the copulation of language with our own body.
(Lacan, 1975-1976 [2006], p. 120)

This year's issue of *LAPSO, Annual Journal of the Master's Program in Lacanian Psychoanalytic Theory* is devoted to the "new imaginary," which Lacan enunciates in the class "On sense, sex, and the real" in *Seminar 23* (1975-1976 [2006]).

As stated in the first editorial, the journal is committed to research, which involves being "open to what is new, not without foundation" (Gómez, 2016), as it is the way we have of "escaping from what we already know, which can only present erudition struggles" (Laurent, 2010, p. 15). In this sense, "a new imaginary" is the notion which serves as the starting point for the questions weaving the weft of *LAPSO's* third issue. Readers will find that the different texts adopt the form of an inquiry about that notion articulated with the different facets of the syntagma.

Since the beginning of Lacanian teaching, we have had elaborations on the imaginary register, a formulation which has become increasingly complex. We could even state that Lacan never stopped using the imaginary; what is more, in his latest teaching he even said that he always adored it (Lacan, 1973). In different references to this topic, we find that it was primarily a scopic imaginary at the beginning; later, when Lacan resorted to the developments of structuralism, the imaginary register was subsumed in the symbolic. He did not abandon it, but the notion of the power of images as long as the Other of language intervenes was put forward. We also find the articulation between image and drive based on the object relation (Brousse, 2012). However, in his late teaching, the imaginary register acquired a different preponderance. Lacan made a conceptual turn by using the topology of the Borromean knot. He also emphasized that the imaginary was equivalent to the symbolic and the real. In *Seminar 23*, he stated:

These three circles of the Borromean knot have this something which cannot fail to be retained, which is the fact that they are all three equivalent as circles. I mean that they are constituted by something which is reproduced in the three. (...) it is the result, let us say, of a certain concentration—that it should be in the imaginary that I place the support of consistency. In the same way that it should be from the hole that I make the essential of what is involved in the symbolic and that, by reason of the fact that the imaginary and the symbolic—this is the very definition of the Borromean knot—are freed one from the other, that I support what I call ex-sistence, especially from the real.
(Lacan, 1975-1976 [2006], p. 50)

Taking these considerations into account and based on the Lacanian corpus, we may ask ourselves what happens to social bonds from the moment the above new traits are established in civilization, or what are the effects on subjectivities caused by the transformations promoted by technoscience.

*LAPSO's Editorial Board
agusbrandi@gmail.com

In 1964, Jacques Lacan stated: “The spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as all-seeing” (Lacan, 1964, p. 82). Today it is evident that the all-seeing world is articulated with the proliferation of screens, which gives the question different overtones. This is the reason why in *The Absolute Eye* (2010) Gérard Wajcman holds that the trait of the epoch produced a new civilization which is the result of an unprecedented mutation, as “science and technology have given their new god eyes that never sleep” (Wajcman, 2010, p. 15). Lacan had anticipated this when he conceptualized the ascent to the social zenith of the object *a* and its implications.

But that is not all with regard to the “new imaginary” proposed by Lacan. In *Seminar 23*, Lacan put forward the notion of the imaginary as consistency, thus alluding to the notion of body. This change of direction led to the consideration of the fact that the *parlêtre* participates in the economy of *jouissance* through images and Jacques-Alain Miller offers clues about this topic when he states that it is about “resorting to the imaginary to get an idea of the real” (Miller, 2013, p. 258).

In *LAPSO*'s third issue, all these clues come together and the question is what Lacan was alluding to when he said “we must be broken, as I might say, into a new imaginary establishing meaning (Lacan, 1975-1976 [2006], p. 120). This quote was the starting point for the authors in *LAPSO* No. 3 to make a singular articulation of the topic. The reader will find texts about the effects of the digitalization of images, the treatment of *jouissance* based on surveillance devices and the new panopticon, the reconsideration of the imaginary register and of the symptom based on the Lacanian developments of the Borromean knot, the clinical practice of artifices and the notion of the consistency of the body, among others.

Philosophy, gender studies, art, and literature are also part of this year's journal. One of the papers tackles Paul B. Preciado's contributions to *pharmacopornography* as a favorable field to inquire about the sense-establishing new imaginary; another deals with the body as the Sovereign Image in the history of art; and, finally, another paper puts forward a hypothesis with regard to Alejandra Pizarnik's work. In addition, there is an interview with the photographer Marcos López, who believes that images are a way of “speaking and breathing.”

Finally, the “*LAPSO* Interview” tells us about a Lacan who “never grows old,” as stated by Baby Novotny in a fecund conversation with Jorge Assef. She answers the question of what she interprets by “breaking into a new imaginary,” alluding to the effect of this Lacanian idea on clinical practice. This is a fundamental interview in *LAPSO*'s third issue dealing with Lacanian clinic, politics, and episteme.

The topic of the issue that lies ahead for the reader to discover is one there is still a lot of questioning to do about: *LAPSO*'s issue No 3: A New Imaginary.

REFERENCES

- Brousse, H. (2012). *Cuando la imagen se hace destino*. Disponible en: <http://nel-medellin.org/brousse-marie-helene-cuando-la-imagen-se-hace-destino/>
- Lacan, J. (1975-1976 [2006]). “El sinthome” en *El Seminario. Libro 23*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (1973). “Los no incautos yerran” en *El Seminario. Libro 21*. Inédito.
- Lacan, J. (1964 [2007]). “Los cuatro conceptos fundamentales del psicoanálisis” en *El Seminario. Libro 11*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Laurent, E. (2010). “¿Como se enseña la clínica?” en *Cuadernos del Instituto Clínico de Buenos Aires*. Buenos Aires: Instituto Clínico de Buenos Aires.
- Miller, J. A. (2013). *El ultimísimo Lacan*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Wajcman, G. (2010). *El ojo absoluto*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.

HAVING A BODY: SOME CLINICAL CONSEQUENCES OF LACAN'S LATE TEACHING¹

ESTEBAN KLAINER *

ABSTRACT

In Lacan's late teaching, we find a change of perspective for psychoanalytic clinical practice. This new perspective implies a reconsideration of the imaginary register and of the symptom based on the writing of the Borromean knot. This work seeks to explore some references that we find in the later Lacan, which are essential to think about the new perspective and the clinical consequences that can be drawn from them.

KEYWORDS

Body image | Symptom | Out-of-body *Jouissance* | *Jouissance* in the body

INTRODUCTION

The invitation to contribute an article to this LAPSO's issue, entitled "A New Imaginary," was particularly interesting for me. On the one hand, it shows our community's growing interest in the reformulations of the imaginary register that we find in Lacan's late teaching. On the other hand, it allows me to present some ideas from the work I have been doing with my EOL colleagues, which became part of a series of three EOL School nights in 2017. These were entitled "Sinthome and Body Image - On Clinical Cases" and have been recently published. There, we tried to place ourselves in a new perspective of psychoanalytic clinical practice, based on the reconsideration of the imaginary dimension by the later Lacan. As Jacques-Alain Miller pointed out a few years ago, if we follow Lacan in his late teaching it is not only for a decoding pleasure, but because there we will find aspects that can provide clinical guidance and also allow us to reconsider the efficacy of our practice (Miller, 2014).

In fact, what we have observed for a long time now is that the people who come to our practice are those suffering from what is not working for them, but who can be said to be unanalyzable because they do not see fit to let the unconscious decode their symptoms. But demand insists and is directed to us; it leads us to reconsider, following our training and education, ideas which we thought were the very foundation of our practice. It is precisely at that point where Lacan opened a new horizon with his latest notion of symptom. This is a horizon to explore over and over again so that an orientation can be built with it.

Now, when we listen to some of these cases, from the first interviews, we find the suffering caused by the impossibility of sustaining a consistent body image.

A young man suffers a severe inhibition every time he is faced with a scene where something he is interested in is at stake. As it is a lifelong difficulty, he describes it as an insurmountable barrier

* Oscar Masotta Institute.
eaklainer@gmail.com

which immerses him into a deep sense of devitalization. Although the inhibition is already a defense against that which might be implied by a step toward the hole of foreclosure, it is but a fragile solution because it always leads him to question the meaning of his life. When the details of those scenes are examined, one can find out what it is that does not work for him: he cannot construct an image of himself with which to enter those scenes. Everything that he can imagine in advance fails, as he cannot “feel” that he has a body to deal with these situations at that moment. A girl says that she wants to be a boy. More specifically, she wants to have a superhero’s body as soon as she sees it on TV. The fundamental disruption for the girl appears in relation to her body. It is a body marked by a certain deficiency at birth. From that moment on, she has enormous difficulty in building a body and, particularly, sustaining a stable body image. The girl presents a series of phenomena characteristic of a loose imaginary which cannot be knotted: from not being able to walk in her early years to not being able to locate her own image in a mirror, as well as permanent splitting effects of her image. In this case, wanting to be a boy appears as an attempt to solve her difficulties in relation to her body image.

A young woman has succeeded in an artistic activity, as a result of hyper-rigid routines to which she subjects herself on a daily basis. It is a resource which she discovered as a child and which allowed her to sustain herself within the family disorder where she lived. Although we can locate this resource as a substitution, its unrestricted nature constantly pushes her to a difficult edge, with a risk of passage to the act. In this case, her body image is constantly threatened by the excess of routines on which she does not seem to be able to set a limit.

As we can see, these are all subjects who, in their singularity, show us from the outset their difficulties in building a consistent body image. Body imaginaries which are not knotted, which get loose, which fall; in other words, they are subjects who cannot “feel” that they have a body. Starting to concern ourselves with these patients’ symptoms, such as difficulties, failures, and disruptions related to body-image building, leads us to a number of complex questions of enormous clinical importance: How can the body image be sustained beyond the Ideal subsidiary resort to the Name of the Father? How is it possible “to have a body” in the sense which this expression takes in Lacan? What is the relationship between “having a body” and the symptom as a body event? These questions relate to Lacan’s late teaching, where a new perspective opens for psychoanalytic clinical practice.

Éric Laurent (2014) notes that the limit of the body as consistency is, precisely, developed in Lacan’s late teaching, where what holds the *parlêtre* together is not the symbolic, but the body as imaginary consistency. If it is the body as imaginary consistency what holds the *parlêtre* together, it seems to be a good path in the direction of the notion of *sinthome*.

Exploring that path is what I propose in this text, based on the consideration of some steps in Lacan’s late teaching, without losing sight of the possibility of drawing a few clinical consequences from it. These are the first steps in a work of elaboration where everything is still to be done.

THE IMAGINARY IN ITS LIMITING FUNCTION

If we return to Laurent’s reference cited above, we can see that Lacan not only locates the body as the imaginary consistency that holds the *parlêtre* together, but also assigns a limiting function to it. First, we should recognize the surprise that such formulation causes! Following Lacan’s teaching itself, the imaginary was always an obstacle, ignorance, a veil, etc., for us. We never thought about it as a limiting function, a function which was always attributed to the symbolic order. Thinking about the imaginary as performing a limiting function implies a strong reconsideration of this register.

We find the beginning of this reconsideration on the first pages of Lacan’s *Seminar 21*. Firstly, decidedly supported by the Borromean knot, he tells us: “the imaginary is as important as the

other dimensions” (Lacan, 1973-1974). That is, at the level of the real of the Borromean knot as a structure, the three registers are strictly equivalent. Secondly, he notes that “the imaginary is always an intuition of what is to be symbolized” (Lacan, 1973-1974). It should be made clear that, at this point in Lacan’s teaching, the symbolic of the knot is not language, the symbolic order, but the pure phonation effects of *lalangue*. Effects of the meaningless swarm of signifiers which have a limitless nature in their own functioning. Then, what does the imaginary sense?


It senses... that which can be chewed and digested of that maddening symbolic which has no limits whatsoever in itself and which cannot be tolerated. We have to stop the symbolic-real very quickly. This is done by knotting the imaginary to it. Based on this idea, everything we have thought of as a symbolic limit, as the Name of the Father and its metaphor, as castration, as phallic signification, as language and as discourse, moves toward the efficacy of the imaginary intuition. Symbolic parasitization can possibly be elaborated by something capable of knotting the body image. (Indart et al., 2018, p.10)

Then, it could be stated that at the Borromean knot level, the imaginary may or may not be knotted, but if it is, it works as a limit for the intrusion of the symbolic. That the possibility of putting the parasitization effects of *lalangue* in order—as well as setting a limit on them—stems from a characteristic of the imaginary is already an indication of a change of perspective from which consequences for the orientation of clinical practice can be drawn.

THE REAL OF THE IMAGINARY. JOUISSANCES

The second step that I consider important to note can be found in Lacan’s (1974 [2015]) *The Third*. This writing can be regarded as a kind of founding text of his late teaching and, in that sense, a turning point regarding his elaborations about the notion of symptom.

With the new writing of the Borromean knot, as the real of the structure, Lacan can radically differentiate, in the field of *jouissance*, two absolutely different modalities. He distinguishes, on the one hand, a type of *jouissance* that is located at the intersection of the symbolic and the real, which he characterizes as an “out-of-body” *jouissance*, and, on the other hand, another *jouissance* that is located between imaginary and real, whose characteristic is to be a *jouissance* “in” the body.



As we can see, the writing of the Borromean knot not only makes the distinction between these two types of *jouissances* possible, but it also shows what is excluded for each of them. Therefore, the *jouissance* that is articulated between symbolic and real is outside the imaginary, whereas that which results from the articulation of imaginary and real is outside the symbolic.

Lacan names phallic *jouissance* the *jouissance* which is located at the intersection of the symbolic-

real. I think it is important to note here how I understand the expression “phallic *jouissance*” at this point in Lacan’s teaching, since I believe that it is a source of misunderstanding and different interpretations among psychoanalysts. I do not think that it refers to the *jouissance* articulated to the phallic signifier, that is, to the operation of symbolic castration linked to the Name of the Father, but to that which accounts for the effects of the entrance of *lalangue* into the living body. Now, how can we understand that it is an out-of-body *jouissance*? We know that it is a *jouissance* that produces the symbolic, the entrance of *lalangue* into the body, and that it is precisely that effect which constitutes the objects *a* which are located at the edges of the body. In his course *Analytical Subtleties*, Miller refers to the “out-of-body” *jouissance* in these terms:

[...] the signifier affects the body of the *parlêtre* because it fragments the *jouissance* of the body and those pieces are the objects *a*. Then, if we stop at this formula, there is supposed to be a first statute of *jouissance* which I used to call *jouissance* of life and which, due to the fact that this is a speaking body in the human species, its *jouissance* is modified in the form of fragmentation and of condensations in what Freud called erogenous zones, each relative to a type of object. (Miller, 2011, p. 278)

It is a *jouissance* experienced in the erogenous zones and, therefore, it never manages to spread to the rest of the body. It marks a regime of emptiness and excess, of a limitless plus and minus, which in its own functioning, says Lacan, bursts the screen “because it does not come from inside the screen” (Lacan, 1974 [2015], p. 20). If we follow him in *The Third*, where he points out that:

The body at least enters into the economy of *jouissance*—that’s where I left off—through the image of the body. The relationship of man—at least what one calls by that name—with his body, if there is something that emphasizes well that it is imaginary, it’s the significance that the image assumes here. (Lacan, 1974 [2015] p. 20)

It is understood that phallic *jouissance* is “out-of-body” because, precisely, it is a *jouissance* which is outside the imaginary; it is contradictory to sustaining the image of the body.

Now, the novelty which appears in Lacan’s late teaching, although multiple antecedents can be found and reread from it, is that the field of *jouissance* is not reduced to phallic and drive-related *jouissance*. The imaginary dimension also has its real, a different real from the one that articulates the symbolic. It is a *jouissance* which, by definition, is outside of language and is experienced, felt, “in” the body. It is precisely that knotting, the one of a *jouissance* with the imaginary, what gives consistency to the image of the body, since it provides it with a real support. It is because of that *jouissance* “in” the body that the *parlêtre* “feels” that “he/she has a body”. This knotting, which gives a real weight to the image of the body if it occurs, is logically prior to the construction of the Other and the resort to the Ideal which, based on the “optical scheme” in Lacan’s early teaching, was the way in which we could understand how the body imaginary was sustained.

Thinking about what holds the imaginary knotted may be a good path in the direction of Lacan’s late elaborations on the symptom.

BODY EVENTS

The young man who I referred to in the introduction happens to pass by a confrontation scene with a child where he says he felt that he was able to make an image of himself for the first time. What characterizes this scene is that it takes place under minimal symbolic demands; nothing of the order of “taking the floor” is at stake in it. After that situation, and with the resource he obtained there, he begins to feel he can enter other scenes which had been insurmountable for him up to that point. He also points out that he feels he has found something which could mean his cure.

A colleague suggests that the young artist could be an understudy in a show for which she would

have to change the dance style on which she had been working so far. The encounter with the new style gives her an unprecedented feeling in her life. She feels another body, absolutely different from that subjected to maddening routines and always on the verge of fragmenting. After this experience, she decides to start a change in her artistic career, where more room can be made for the new style and for the body sensation which accompanies it.

Also by chance, the trans girl finds on the television screen the resource which allows her to feel her body image. In her case, this accounts for the fact that the demand for a sex change has nothing to do with questions of object-choice or sexuation, but it is based on the disruptions in her body at the level of the difficulty in sustaining a consistent body imaginary.

In their singularity, the three cases show events which seem to imply a before and after in the existence of these subjects. These are contingencies which become events, as they produce a knot with which another body is assembled, and which consist, descriptively, in the effect of feeling a *jouissance* “in” the body, a *jouissance* that is knotted to their body image. They also testify to how “feeling” that they have a body image stops, albeit momentarily, the parasitization of *lalangue* and its out-of-body *jouissance*, without this being due to the action of any Name of the Father. Now, although the scenes where those “body events” and their effects occur can be located fairly precisely, it is not easy to understand how that happens. Pondering what can be that which ties a knot to the imaginary finds answers in a new notion of symptom which can be found in the later Lacan.

Firstly, in *The Third* Lacan points out that he calls “*symptom* that which comes from the real” (Lacan, 1974 [2015], p. 15). This simple formulation is a novelty whose consequences we may not have weighed completely. Stating that the symptom comes from the real implies distancing himself from Freud and from the Lacan of the return to Freud. In Freud, the symptom was something linked to the repressive action of the father, that is, to a product of the symbolic. The drive-related demand was found in the “no” of the paternal function which promoted repression, and the symptom was the result of a transaction between the drive-related demand and the repressive instance, a formation of commitment. Redefining the symptom as coming from the real separates it from any reference to the Name of the Father and leaves it on the contingency plane.

The second novelty which can be found in that same writing is that the symptom, which comes from the real, “is not reduced to phallic *jouissance*” (Lacan, 1974 [2015], p. 23). This means none other than that the symptom not only articulates the symbolic-real “out-of-body” *jouissance*, but also that other *jouissance*, imaginary-real *jouissance* “in” the body. Having located these two novelties in Lacan’s reformulation on the symptom, I think it is possible to enter, without getting too lost, the definition of the symptom as a “body event” which we find in the writing *Joyce the Symptom* (Lacan, 1976 [2012]). There, Lacan holds that the symptom is an event linked to the body which one “has”, that is, linked to an experience of *jouissance* “in” the body, from which one feels that one has that body. It is precisely in *Joyce* that Lacan can locate the function of the symptom—as a body event—as the resource which allows him to knot his body imaginary. It is the *sinthomatic* certainty of being “the artist,” the event which allowed him to re-knot his body image, the one which fell like a shell. That was for *Joyce* a certainty which gave him a body and allowed him to hold it against the intrusive effects of *lalangue* which he suffered. It is precisely *Joyce*, whom Lacan—not by chance—calls *Joyce the Symptom*, who shows the knotting function of the symptom as a body event.

We arrive, then, at the fact that the symptom, a contingency which comes from the real and which is not reduced to phallic *jouissance*, is what may allow us to keep the imaginary knotted and to “have a body.” A body which, in order to sustain itself, no longer depends on a trait of the Ideal, but on the knotting effect of the symptom. As Éric Laurent (2016) points out, it is about a “having” first, prior to the dialectics of being and having dependent on the field of Other.

It turns out, as noted in the introduction to the text, that an ever-increasing number of people come to our practice suffering from not being able to sustain their bodies because they do not feel them. So, for that clinical practice, albeit not exclusively, in the reconfiguration of the imaginary and of the symptom in its knotting function in Lacan's late teaching, we find a new perspective which opens a horizon for the position of the analyst and the efficacy of his/her practice. A position which is expected to really be beyond the father.

REFERENCES

- **Indart, J.C.; Benito, E.; Gasbarro, C.; Klainer, E.; Rubinetti, C. and Vitale F.** (2018). *Sinthome and body image - Around clinical cases*. Buenos Aires: Grama.
- **Lacan, J.** (1973-1974). "The Not Unsuspecting err on the side" at Jacques Lacan's Seminary. 21. Unpublished.
- **Lacan, J.** (1974[2015]). "The Third" in *Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis*. Number 18. (pp. 9 - 32). Buenos Aires: Grama.
- **Lacan, J.** (1975-1976[2006]). "The Sinthome" at Jacques Lacan's Seminary. Book 23. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- **Lacan, J.** (1976[2012]). "Joyce the Symptom" in *Other Writings*. (pp.591 - 597). Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- **Laurent, É.** (2014). "Subversion of subversion" on Radio Lacan. Retrieved from www.radiolacan.com
- **Laurent, É.** (2016). *The reverse side of biopolitics*. Buenos Aires: Grama.
- **Miller, J.A.** (2011). "Analytical subtleties" in Jacques-Alain Miller's *Psychoanalytical Courses*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- **Miller, J.A.** (2014). "The unconscious and the speaking body" in *Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis*. Number 17. (pp. 21 - 45). Buenos Aires: Grama.

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE IMAGINARY IN CURRENT CLINICAL PRACTICE¹

GISELA SMANIA *

ABSTRACT

The course of this research locates, in the last Lacan's teaching and the Borromean knot perspective, the statute of the Imaginary unavoidably linked to the consistency of the body. Four hypotheses are proposed in order to interrogate from the clinical practice the artifices that are brought into play to produce a possible relationship to the body.

KEYWORDS

Imaginary | Body | Consistency | Mental | Knot | *Jouissance* | Time | *Lalangue*

INTRODUCTION

The research we carried out within the context of the Seventh American Meeting of Lacanian Orientation Psychoanalysis (ENAPOL)² started with the aim of revisiting the concepts of psychoanalysis and the foundations of clinical practice. Over the past few years, the psychoanalytic community as a whole has made steady progress along a line of elaboration supported by the determined encouragement of Lacan's late teaching and its readjustments, between routine and invention, between continuity and discontinuity. Therefore, having scrutinized the statute of the symbolic in our century—which has become neither an order nor a regulation, but a “system of semblants that do not govern the real, but rather are subordinate to the real” (Miller, *The Unconscious and the Speaking Body*, 31)—and having scrutinized this real—as a real without law—, it is our turn to re-situate the imaginary according to our times, in an attempt not to read it simply as the sovereignty of images today, and purposely start from its quality in the Borromean knot and its inescapable closeness to the other two registers. Only from there can we locate the ways in which the topology of these fields of experience—R.S.I.—has been affected. In other words, it is our turn to move forward and look into how those close neighbors, those three properties of the strings, get along with one another in order for us to be able to derive the points of clinical elaboration that we are trying to arrive at.

Consequently, locating what we mean by “the consistency of the imaginary,” which is the formula that the title of this paper is already pointing to, demands that we should make the necessary turns in the broad perspective that Lacan left open for us, from the initial fact of the paths of the experience of identification in the Mirror Stage, the joy of the body, the pregnancy of its image and its putting *into shape*; including the operation imposed by the symbolic on the body, making the signifiers leaven in it and leave their furrows; all of this, not without the trimming of objects as pieces, nooks and crannies, refuges of *jouissance* at the edges of the body, plugged into the body—like flowers in a vase—via the unifying image; clues that will culminate in the question

*Escuela de la Orientación Lacaniana (EOL)
giselasmania@hotmail.com

about the affectation of the body, its imaginary consistency, its stumbling upon *lalangue*, and the mystery of the real that lives in it.

Therefore, in order for us to be able to refer to the statute of the imaginary, it is essential to locate how the “real” power of images, their “power of realization” (Brousse, *Lacanian Bodies*) has always been at play for Lacan from his earliest intuition in the mirror. That is, the imaginary has never been there to designate any kind of imagery, but to account for its real consequence, or to “call them what they are called, affects” (Lacan, *The Sinthome*, 147) designating the relationship that everyone can establish with their body.

This is the context in which we seek to place the coordinates of our discussion, under the hypothesis of the following first statement: the imaginary is the body. Referring the imaginary, as such, to the body and its economy of *jouissance*³ will allow us—following Jacques-Alain Miller’s invitation—to draw the consequences from the cases we are faced with today, as they impose giving the body a more and more relevant function. Thus, we have a duty to formalize the way in which we deal with that which constitutes the original relationship to one’s own body with every *parlêtre*, the way in which everybody becomes the “owner of One-body” (*The Latest Lacan*, 107). What can we situate today of everybody’s unceasing effort to give consistency to the body, there where we verify ways of *jouir* that are no longer indexed to the Other? How do we have a body today, beyond the “symbolic virtues shown by the love for the father” (107)? What statute can be given to the forms of “contemporary corporeization when we say that the Other does not exist” (Miller, *The Experience of the Real...*, 397)?

Based on these first questions, we propose four discussion points. Each of this, in its own way, delimits beacons that emerge from our reading path. These four points, far from being conclusive, are ready to be used, to be disaggregated with each other:

FIRST CONJECTURE: THERE IS THE BODY RELATIONSHIP VERSUS THERE IS NO SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP

If we have to say how *one* relationship to the body is possible for a subject, the “body relationship” can be thought of, as a first conjecture, as “that which there is”. In order to refer to “that which there is,” Lacan places his fundamental syntagma “There is something of the One” (*...Or Worse*, 126), understanding that what comes to the foreground with the primacy of the One is *jouissance*, *jouissance* of the body. We can state that these ways of saying: “that which there is”, “there is something of the One”, or “there is the body relationship” (Miller, *Spare Parts*, 416), come to the place of “there is no sexual relationship.” However, we know that there is no possible relationship to the body that does not support itself but on the structural error of the sexual, that there is no proportion or written harmony in the body, that is, that which “there is” of the relationship to the body does not suppress the verification of that which there is not. In this sense, it is necessary to point out that the consistency of the body dimension is not precisely “that which is compact,” as there will always be a holed toric body. This determines the fact that “the ownership of the body” always lies against a background of inescapable *extimacy*. Otherwise, the subject’s effort to “have” a body, to invent a possible relationship with it, would not be found in our clinical practice. Already in his Seminar *Encore*, Lacan stated, “There is no sexual relationship, there is *jouissance*” (90). In addition, his expression “There is something of the One, the One all alone” (82) will be the formula that enthrones the face of a non-dialecticizable *jouissance*. Although his endeavor to insert the One of *jouissance* in the experience can be found in the Seminar *...Or Worse*, we can already situate an antecedent in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* in the light of his thoughts on the holophrase. Back then, Lacan had already envisaged a special body relationship, which does not call for any sense, which resists all dialectic openness, and mysteriously places there the soundness of the psychosomatic phenomenon, almost as an anticipation of the field of the One. Regarding this point, the following question should be asked:

are we still using the clinical element of psychosomatic disorders?, how do we make use of that clinical category today? It is interesting to trace in Lacan's teaching that which takes us from one context of elaboration to another, in order to later articulate absorption—or the indexation of that which is psychosomatic—with this to the field of the One, opposed to the Other. The issue will be then how to influence, from the analytic operation, the cases where this condition of porosity and openness to the Other is not at stake. There are examples at hand when we speak of the scope that we can give this clinical field today, rarely mentioned by Lacan. Among others, we can mention the growing phenomena of celiac disease or early-onset diabetes in adolescents, who only find a livable edge in the body, a quilting point via a diet, a device, an insulin pump, a small ritual, an injection, etc.

SECOND CONJECTURE: ONE HAS ONE'S BODY, ONE IS NOT IT TO ANY DEGREE

In order to name this second conjecture, we used Lacan's expression in *The Sinthome* (147), which is useful to locate the fact that having a body is not something natural at all, but rather an operation is required to give it consistency. What is the nature of this consistency? Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines consistency as the "degree of firmness, density, viscosity, or resistance to movement or separation of constituent particles," articulating it with cohesion and the body. Along this line, Lacan states that consistency "means what holds together," adding—almost like a Witz—"God help us, the only idea we have of consistency is a sack or a floor cloth. Even the body the way we feel it is like skin, retaining in its sack a pile of organs" (63). However, the sack is empty, and "is only imaginable from the ex-sistence and the consistency that the body has, that the body has by being a pot" (18).

Now, how can we differentiate this reference which places "what holds together" with "what knots together" typical of the *sinthome*? According to Lacan, one's relationship to one's own body, at this point, becomes suspicious for the analyst, as the body tends to "clear off" (64), or it may become something that "asks for nothing than to go away, to be shed like the skin of a fruit" (147). The analyst finds his or her chances there, making a bet—in the acrobatics of transference—between, on the one hand, the suspicion of the imaginary consistency and, on the other, the confidence in the symptom as that which occurs in the body, noticing that its nature is that of invention and knot.

Then, it is fundamental to maintain this ethical distinction between body and being. We mean ethics in the sense of the implications that the contemporary disquisitions on the being have at present, there where the market offers a range of identitary possibilities, which seem to dress the body but which say little about its acceptance, about its possession. Following the line of Jacques-Alain Miller's approach in his course *Spare Parts*, it is "the Borromean perspective that introduces the *having*, [and does it precisely] to separate the being from the body. The Borromean knot separates the body from the symbolic" (65). Here, symbolic dependence as the host of subjective advent yields its place to the affectation of the body with the *trou* that language introduces, which introduces the subtlety of the effort involved—for the *parlêtre*—in producing a livable arrangement with the effects of that rattling, with the devices that he or she must lay hands on in order to remain bound to the experience of imaginary unity in the strict sense in which we have been thinking of it. In our times, these devices teach us, just like that, about the status of this new imaginary.

THIRD CONJECTURE: THE CONSISTENCY OF THE BODY IS MENTAL

For this conjecture, we started from an unsettling expression by Lacan in *The Sinthome*: "The *sentimentality* of the *parlêtre*, (...) in so far as, since he senses it, he senses the burden of it" (63). He also articulates mentality—"the *ment-ality* in so far as he lies (*ment*)" (64)—with self love and adoration of the body. What does he mean by mental? What is the relationship of the mental to thinking, which—as Lacan points out in *The Third*—does not exist without the body, the reason

why we “get bogged down in confusion”? Again in the course *Spare Parts*, Jacques-Alain Miller works, however, on the distinction between these two planes of the mental and thinking and states that “whereas mentality is linked to the body itself, thinking involves a reference, a gravitation toward sexual intercourse, and this means that the adoration of the other body is brought into play” (418). Following the line of this argument, in the Seminar *The Sinthome*, Lacan does not say that subjects *think* they have a body; he says they *believe* they have it. It is worth highlighting the statute of belief here, which is not assigned to the transcendental fact of the relationship to the Other, but assumed—in some kind of immanence—as an adoration of *oneself*. Therefore, we have the mental consistency of the body, defined as an imaginary support, belief, and wrapping. According to Lacan, mentality somehow concerns an imaginary edge and its inertia, which subtracts the body as a “text” of signs for each speaking being.

On the other hand, it is not the first time Lacan has used the adjective “mental” to refer to certain clinical and bodily phenomena. For example, what is the relevance, in light of these ideas, of “mental anorexia” as a way of having a body and providing it with a wrapping? When Lacan shares his elaborations on these kinds of cases, he shows the presence of a real and opaque nucleus that is irreducible to the field of the Other.

FOURTH CONJECTURE: HAVING A BODY, NOT WITHOUT THE REAL OF TIME

We are especially interested in this fourth conjecture in order to situate how “the mental consistency of the body is really affected by the time that passes before the eternity of the verbal” (*The Latest Lacan*, 13). Today, it is about the experience of carrying the body linked to the passing of time, life and body confronted with the unforeseen event. This means that “having a body” does not exist without the real of time, different from the eternity of the Signifier. In this regard, how do topology and time play their game in the cases we work on in our clinical practice? This becomes an absolutely relevant clinical crux which translates, for example, into children’s fear of their own death or that of the Other, which is testimony to the fact that there is no body that can rest on any kind of reassurance under “the feeling that arises as a result of this suspicion that comes to us, of being reduced to our body (*The Third*, 27). Other examples serve to represent tyranny and the surplus *jouissance* in the body-time knot: the nightmare and the infinite chicanery of thoughts; the unstoppable in the agitation of the act; the addictive performance of the symptom and the deadly blade of mania, or its reverse in the exhaustion of the bodies and their devitalization. On the other hand, the promise of eternal youth, which does not imply a novelty but which dwells in the most varied fictions since immemorial times, has come across the market’s and technology’s yearning, on a global scale, for intervening in the real, sweeping the subject effect away in that very same act, with the singular treatment of a *jouissance*, always disharmonious to the body. All in all, if the ownership of a body and the “being alive” are verified there where “something [that] enjoys itself (*cela se jouit*)” (*Encore*, 32), that *cela se jouit* requires more and more devices to carry the body in the face of the drift and the temporal dimension at play. The erotics of time thus influences the bodies and acquires new characteristics. We thus situate the clinical value of this three-word expression: body-time-superego. All its consequences will have to be drawn from it.

To conclude, it is our turn in every case to locate how the analyst, through his or her presence, can become a *partenaire* of One-body to accompany its “suturing and splicing” (*The Sinthome*, 71) along the path of analysis, aware of the edge of radical exile on which they rest. On some occasions, the analyst—ready and sensitive to contingency—is there to introduce a surplus of life in the relationship to the body; on others, to find together with the subject the S1 that works as a cobble in the swamp, so that everyone can find their particular way of tracing and retracing the knot.

¹ Research group: Gisela Smania- Responsable (Member of the EOL and the AMP), Gabriela Dargentón (AME, member of the EOL and the AMP, AE between 1999 and 2002), Beatriz Gregoret (Member of the EOL and the AMP), Carolina Aiassa (Member of the EOL and the AMP), Graciela Martínez (Member of the EOL and the AMP), Silvina Sanmartino (Member of the EOL and the AMP), Martín Cottone (Adherent member of the CIEC)

² 7th ENAPOL “The Empire of Images”, Sao Paulo, 2015.

³ Lacan said it very clearly in *The Third*: “the body enters into the economy of jouissance through the image of the body” (*Revista Lacaniana* N° 18, p. 20)..

REFERENCES

- Brousse, M.-H. (2010). “Cuerpos Lacanianos”. *Conferencia en Granada. Instituto del Campo Freudiano*. Disponible en: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uq9FNVULsMw
- Lacan, J. (1988). “Conferencia en Ginebra sobre el síntoma” en *Intervenciones y textos 2*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.
- Lacan, J. (1975-1976 [2006]). “El Sinthome” en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 23*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (1972-1973 [2008]). “Aún” en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 20*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (1971-1972 [2012]). “... O peor” en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 19*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (2012). “Radiofonía” en *Otros Escritos*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (2015). “La Tercera” en *Lacaniana* N° 18, Año X. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.
- Mandil, R. A. (2016). *Parlêtre y consistencia corporal*. Disponible en: <http://www.congressoamp2016.com/uploads/4af8f923c0239c0a6a67b36d083e26a8e2722904.pdf>.
- Miller, J.-A. (2011). *La experiencia de lo real en la cura psicoanalítica*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2013). *Piezas sueltas*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2014). *El Últimísimo Lacan*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2014). “El Inconsciente y el cuerpo hablante” en *Lacaniana* N° 17, Año IX. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.
- Miller, J.-A. (2014). “Tener un cuerpo” en *Lacaniana* N° 17, Año IX. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.

SURVEILLED AND SURVEILLANT SUBJECTS IN THE SOCIETY OF CONTROL¹

SONIA MANKOFF *

ABSTRACT

In our civilization, images are experiencing a mutation from which a use of precise *jouissance* in *parlêtres* is being developed. Two treatments of *jouissance* are revealed: on the one hand, the relation to the surveillance that rules and disciplines bodies and, on the other, an unprecedented use of the imaginary register. The voluntary servitude expressed in the omnivoyeur eye of the epoch and the empire of images direct us toward a spectacle effect, just like toward a movement where the superegoic imperative urges us to act without restraint.

KEYWORDS

Surveillance | Image | Imaginary | Body

INTRODUCTION

The two signifiers proposed by the title of our research, surveillance and control, are somehow present in the different ways in which civilization has governed *jouissance* in every epoch; however, they adopt particular modes in our current times. As we know, Lacan defines discourse as a social bond, a wordless structure that allows us to treat that which escapes signifying articulation, *jouissance*, ineliminable as such in every social bond. The treatment this *jouissance* is given in each of the discourses contributes to its particularity. Our epoch promotes a recovery of *jouissance* without loss (discourse of the capitalist); this treatment causes some aversion (Fanjwaks, 2015) to words and has effects on subjectivity and, as such, on the forms the social bond takes.

The empire of images names a use of *jouissance* that is being witnessed by our civilization. Surveillance and our simultaneous position as both surveilled and surveillant subjects is one of the faces of this empire. Being always on the go, so pervasive in almost every aspect of our lives, is powerfully manifested in the way we are constantly bombarded by images. These preliminary considerations make it possible to state that the 21st century's society of control does not have the same characteristics and does not serve the same purposes as, for example, the panopticon that M. Foucault developed last century. Therefore, elucidating those differences is a first step to approach the analysis of the way in which it takes control in the age of technology.

The complacency that *parlêtres* show in the face of the empire of images and its effects is one of the other facets that is evidenced in our present-day society of control. Voluntary servitude, a concept formulated in the 16th century, actualizes the tendency to submission (Miller, 2015) that characterizes our times.

* Research and Clinical Study Center (CIEC)
soniamankoff@uolsinectis.com.ar

Finally, the effects of the current use of images on the body raise the question about the clinical perspective. Ours is an epoch that swings between the ideal of absolute transparency and the right to privacy; the opacity of *jouissance* is increasingly blurred and returns as body phenomena that are not necessarily articulated to the unconscious, and about which we hear in our practice. M. Bassols' article in *Mediodicho 40* is eloquent in that regard. In addition, *parlêtres* begin to make an unprecedented use of the imaginary register, just as Lacan developed it in his late teaching, which opens a path to new symptomatic arrangements that should be explored and formalized. In order to address the issue, three questions are asked. The first one consists in situating *What differences do we find between our present-day society of control and other moments in civilization in which surveillance has taken the place of social control?* The second question addresses the following: *What satisfaction does that imaginary machinery cause in the parlêtre which makes it possible for it to be viable and multiply?* The third question seeks to analyze *What subjective consequences of that omnivoyeur gaze do we find in clinical practice?*

SURVEILLED AND SURVEILLANT SUBJECTS IN THE SOCIETY OF CONTROL

An unprecedented mutation is taking place in the history of humankind. It changes our relation with the world, with our body, even with our being. That mutation does not occur secretly but in front of our eyes. However, we cannot see it with precision and in all its breadth. It is neither an evolution, nor a revolution, nor an accident; it is neither a dark threat nor a conspiracy; it has not been deliberated by a conscience, nor is it caused by a dark power. (...) It causes itself. We have entered another world. The 21st century has just set off and the revelation is made that a new modernity, a new civilization, has been born.
(Wajcman, 2011, p. 13)

Last century, M. Foucault (Foucault, 2012) developed the objectives of the panopticon toward the domestication of bodies with a view to control and usefulness. He also stated that the age of disciplines promoted the organization of that which is multiple, an order-building experience; each body situated in a space and in a discipline was a useful body. The invisible eye of the panopticon in which everyone could be watched at any time had disciplinary effects on subjects. That is not the function screens serve today. On the contrary, they are multiplied to infinity in an endless and aimless bombardment of images. Today each one of us is both surveilled and surveillant, docile to be looked at, located, bombarded by images at all times, but at the same time looking and showing incessantly. In the previous conversation we had with the members of the EBP and NEL groups, we situated a precision to bear in mind regarding the differences between today's and last century's society of control. We should distinguish between the disciplinary effects of the panopticon's invisible eye and the spectacle effects of today's omnivoyeur eye.

In today's omnivoyeur eye, we find the voracious eye, as Lacan situates it in Seminar 11 (Lacan, 1964) [1973]), which pushes us to look more and more, but in addition to a *jouissance* of showing. Looking at the image of the other, his or her life and intimacy, as well as exhibiting own's own, implies going toward the society of the spectacle. Its effects are not disciplinary, but rather a reinforcement of the drive.

The omnivoyeur eye is that of surveillance, but in a certain symptomatic sense, surveillance is configured as an attempt to see more, to catch that which still cannot be seen, an illusion of absolute transparency which technology produces and which does not know the opacity of the real. A difference which stands out in our epoch is that the effect of shame—which Lacan situates in Seminar 11—is not verified, or at least not in the same sense as it was last century. What persists is the effect of strangeness, an effect of uneasiness which Lacan and Freud taught us to

distinguish in the face of the *unheimlich*, that is, in the face of that which shows the opacity of the most intimate *jouissance*. As Heidegger says when writing about Hölderlin's poetry, "In this strangeness he proclaims his unflinching nearness" (Heidegger, 1994, p. 175).

We hear about this uneasiness in different ways in our clinical practice: the subject who feels foreign in front of the wall of images, for example, or the strangeness in front of his or her own images exhibited in social media networks.

The push to omnivoyeurism, together with a certain position of voluntary servitude, provides the framework for the surveillance of our society of control.

SURVEILLANCE AS A PUSH TO LEGAL ACTION

Another answer to the question about how the machinery of surveillance works in the empire of images can be found in the effect of reinforcement of the superego, which the epoch fosters and which further clarifies the reasons for the emergence of the society of control.

Normative inflation (the increasing number of regulations to legislate everything), the attempt to prevent that which might escape the law by means of protocols that could spot future criminals, for example, and the push to resort to legal action in matters of social bonds, thus becomes the reverse of the imperative to *jouir* which the discourse itself fosters.

Several years ago, in our community we created a research space called *Bringing suffering under control* where we look into the reasons for and the consequences of a society which tries to control bodies from birth, while pushing to an ever-increasing satisfaction of *jouissance* at the same time. In this research, we situate the Push to Legal Action—an effect of the fall of authority figures in the social Other—as a social symptom. This push also explains the promotion of rights as a mark of this epoch which somehow articulates the right to *jouir* with normativization. The purpose is for everybody's right to *jouissance* to be guaranteed by law.

The society of control is then another name for the social symptom which is an effect of the decline of the regulation of *jouissance* in civilization.

VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

"Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy upon you, if you do not provide them yourselves?" (La Boétie, 2006, p. 22). The *parlêtres* of our epoch are fascinated by screens and demand surveillance. The signifier *security* is inscribed as an S1.

Étienne La Boétie, a 16th-century French writer and politician, mentioned by Miller in chapter 16 of *Ultimísimo Lacan (The Latest Lacan, Miller, 2013)*, wrote the *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude* at the age of 18. This text was against absolutism and La Boétie asked the above quoted question there.

He thus locates the necessary complacency that should exist on the side of the subject for control to become effective. We ask ourselves: what form does this complacency take in our times? In *The Lyric Illusion (2015)*, a text published after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine office in Paris, Jacques-Alain Miller eloquently describes the voluntary servitude of our times:

(...) Yes, we want to be watched, listened to, tracked, if life is at stake. The great flight to voluntary servitude. Did I say voluntary? Desired, claimed, required. On the horizon, the Leviathan, *Pax et Princeps*. (...) [E]ven the Republicans regarded "submission to absolute rule" as a lesser evil. (...) [T]he tendency today, contrary to appearances, is not resistance, but submission. (Miller, 2015)

Miller highlights the paradox of the answer of subjects in an epoch without the Other, submission. How can we understand this paradox?

In our democratic societies, the hypermodern subject's relation with leadership takes the form of a cooperation in the name of security. Leadership is not produced under the assertive form, but under the form of advice, even need. Subjects who obey incessantly and demonstrate for more police protection demand more surveillance cameras. In the 2013 Conference of the Lacanian Orientation School (EOL), Eric Laurent related this cooperative obedience with the illusion of a politics without master-signifiers which leads to the superegoization of the world, the dream of a politics that is sustained on S2, that is, without impositions.

THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVITY

As we said earlier, some of the effects of the bombardment of images are verified in certain reinforcement of the satisfaction of the drive, in the uneasiness in the face of that which is incessantly close to the opacity of each subject's *jouissance*, and also in the push, which witnesses the sovereign presence of the superego and its consequences.

In addition, we can see the effects of the empire of images on childhood. Surveilling the child was—or still is in some cases—part of a false reassurance to be safe, a reassurance of immortality, according to Freud. The difference we find today—since, as we said, bodies have always been surveilled—is that there is a surveillance of the images of the bodies, a surveillance through screens. It is not the contact of the bodies, their nearness, the exchange, the questions, but their images, as well as being captured by a surveillance of oneself in the images. What happens is that there is no opposition to the aspiration to be seen when there is no symbolic order. That is why, rather than overestimating virtues by forgetting defects, as Freud stated in relation to the child he called *His majesty the Baby*, today's push wants something more: to erase defects. In that sense, we are unsure whether it is about narcissism or, in any case, that it should be suggested as the only interpretation, but zero volition and zero defect appear, as Eric Laurent (2013) teaches us. Zero defect is the wild face of an attempt to control childhood evidenced in the symptoms of the children who come to our practice. The other face of this control crisis is the child alone in the face of the difficulty he or she has in appropriating his or her body, expressing the fear it causes. The empire of images and its consequent aversion to language (Fanjwaks, 2015) is also verified in body phenomena which are not necessarily articulated to the unconscious and result in an unprecedented use of the imaginary by *parlêtres*. This leads us to consider the difference between image and imaginary and to situate an enabling function of the image which opens a very prolific research path.

“The imaginary as it gives us fundamental coordinates to live in this world (...) We get out of the tangle with the image” (Laurent, 2012).

THE PROMOTION OF THE IMAGINARY AS AN EFFECT OF THE SILENCE OF THE REAL

Regarding the imaginary, we situate a first difference between the abundance of images which, having lost their articulation with the symbolic, produces the encounter with a piece of the real to which anxiety responds—a real which is no longer subjected to the symbolic and lets the imaginary result in its chaos—and another perspective of the imaginary which situates it as the rim of the real.

In Chapter 15 of *Ultimísimo Lacan (The Latest Lacan)*, Miller (2013), entitled *The real does not speak*, Miller uses signifiers which make it possible to feel the opacity we have to deal with in the analytic experience: “all psychoanalysis occurs in the dark,” (Miller, 2013, p. 234) he says and

adds: “the real is mute, as well as the knowledge it includes” (Miller, 2013, p. 242). One does not look for this mute real; it is of the order of the encounter and this locates the promotion of the category of contingency in the *parlêtre*'s clinical experience.

This opacity also involves the politics of the cure and the transmission of the clinical practice.

We are in some kind of turning point regarding the consequences of Lacan's late and latest teachings, in which we stumble upon the difficulty of formalization, of transmission, and even of orientation in a certain sense, in a clinical practice which we are already doing, but which we still have not conceptualized enough.

THE RETURN TO THE IMAGINARY

In the same text, Miller locates the return to the imaginary as one of the consequences of this mute real; he interprets that Lacan does a promotion of the imaginary (Miller, 2013) under the form of the promotion of the body.

Miller states that “*jouissance*, contingency, and the body combine in a promotion of the imaginary” (Miller, 2013, p. 246).

Two operations take place in the analytic experience: the imaginization of the symbolic and the imaginization of the real. The former strives to get the real to speak, not without resorting to the semblant. However, the hardest challenge is bridging the gap between the imaginary and the real, via the imaginization of the real. “In the silence of the real, and while one should always be suspicious of the symbolic which tells lies, only the resort to the imaginary is left, that is, to the body, that is, to the weft” (Miller, 2013, p. 259).

The fabric, then, involves a materiality and an image that circumscribe the interstices between the threads; the fabric is with the body and also with the word; it is a weft that catches something. The perspective of the fabric makes it possible to clearly grasp the difference between the imaginization of the real and the bombardment of images whose empire marks our epoch.

REFERENCES

- La Boétie, E. (2006). *Discurso sobre la servidumbre voluntaria*. Buenos Aires: Libros de la Araucaria.
- Fajnwaks, F. (2015). “Cómo vivimos hoy”. En *Colección Grulla*. Córdoba: Centro de investigación y estudios clínicos.
- Foucault, M. (2012). *Vigilar y Castigar*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Heidegger, M. (1994). “Poéticamente habita el hombre” en *Conferencias y artículos*. Barcelona: Serbal.
- Lacan, J. (1964 [1973]). “Los cuatro conceptos fundamentales del psicoanálisis” en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro II*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Laurent, E. (2012). “El psicoanálisis y la crisis del control de la infancia” en *El Caldero de la Escuela*. N° 20. Buenos Aires: Escuela de la Orientación Lacaniana.
- Laurent, E. (2012). *Hablar con el propio síntoma, hablar con el propio cuerpo*. Disponible en: http://www.enapol.com/es/template.php?file=Argumento/Hablar-con-el-propio-sintoma_Eric-Laurent.html
- Miller, J. A. (2014). *El ultimísimo Lacan*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J. A. (2015). “La ilusión lírica” en *Lacan Cotidiano*. Disponible en: <http://www.eol.org.ar/biblioteca/lacancotidiano/LC-cero-454.pdf>
- Wajcman, G. (2011). *El ojo absoluto*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.

NOTE ON THE DIGITIZED IMAGE

FABIAN FAJNWAKS*

ABSTRACT

This paper inquires into the statute of images and the relation of subjects to them, based on the consideration that we are invaded by images we consume and produce. The novelty of the digitalization of images is presented, whose consequence is the inscription into a real register, thus introducing a novel relation between the imaginary and the real. With digital images, the symbolic statute is reduced to the real. Based on Gérard Wajcman's work *The Absolute Eye*, a question is raised about what the author calls "the wall of images," referring to the ambition of science to see it all, to the omnipotence of the gaze as a universal eye.

KEYWORDS

Digital image | Pixel | Technoscience | Universal eye | Gérard Wajcman | Registers | Aall of images | Digital body

If we are constantly invaded by images, images that we consume and produce, images that make reading on tablets possible, this phenomenon is not new in itself. What is really new is the digitalization of images, their encryption in a digital language: this radically modifies not only the very statute of images but, above all, our relation to them. Armed with the three Lacanian registers, what we can immediately say is that images are inscribed, from now on, into a real register, because of the very nature of that encryption, which implies, then, a novel articulation between the imaginary and the real introduced by technology, which the term *data* names and which is no more than a vicissitude of the long process it has taken *technosciences* to mathematize the real.

Incidentally, digital images do not mathematize absolutely anything, but rather write in a digital language what thousands of cameras cover on the planet's surface, the unlimited remoteness of the universe, as well as the unlimited minuteness of the human body, with the promise of successfully encrypting, in the near future, all the existing information in the universe of the speaking being. The famous Moore's law, formulated in the 1950s, which states that the storage capacity of microprocessors doubles every two years, does nothing but verify this ambition. This law has been demonstrated to hold for the current possible storage capacity of chips.

The pixel, the unit of digital measurement of this encryption, determines a particular nature of images: it no longer presents the same texture that all types of support had given it so far, because its structure is numerical, reduced to the combination of 1 and 0. In any case, what we have is a new digital support that has introduced new images into our world. Our colleague and friend Gérard Wajcman gives us the paradigm of this difference when he tells us, in *The Absolute Eye* (Wajcman, 2010), how he comes up against this limit of the pixel in lieu of the pigment of paint, as he tries to come as close as possible to a painting by Velázquez while visiting Google-El Prado. This project aims to make us believe that, thanks to technology, we would be able to take a

* Université Paris VIII
fabian.fajnwaks@orange.fr

better look at the paintings than we would if we were actually in the museum. However, because of the digitalization of images, when we come close to any of the paintings, we bump into that which encrypts images, the pixel, beyond which images are empty. Thus, the eye cannot capture what Cézanne called “the truth in painting” (Wajcman, 2010, p. 66) and that which is there for us to see is no more than the truth of the image. As the author says,

the problem lies both in that the engineers at the virtual museum Google-El Prado substitute the truth for the image itself and in that by giving themselves the illusion—and by giving it to us—of being able to tear out the truth in painting, they do nothing but give us a truth of the image. (Wajcman, 2010, p. 66)

Walter Benjamin had already addressed this problem in the text *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (1936 [2017]). It is not so much about the multiplication of the image itself as its mechanical reproduction allows, but rather about the very modification of the image through its digital encryption.

Those of us who love photography are aware of this frustration that Wajcman points out, with the fissure that digital photography introduced with the loss of the grain of photos in the passage from silver to digital photography. Images themselves have changed and, with them, perhaps so has the statute of the imaginary, which is no longer articulated with the symbolic, making Lacan say that the statute of perception is a signifier, since with digital images this statute may be reduced to its real statute. Certainly, we can still introduce the signifier into images, but noting the impoverished imaginary world of today’s adolescents is enough to make us think that access to images, in which they are immersed almost permanently, might have the same nature as pornography, that is, a statute that no longer accommodates the symbolic, thus certifying its decline, this image recovered due to its real nature, that is, encrypted.

Images produce joy; Lacan pointed that out through the satisfaction of the young speaking being after discovering his image in the experience of the mirror mentioned in the famous *Mirror Stage* (Lacan, 1997), but we wonder whether these new saturated digital images might redouble the surplus *jouissance* (*plus de jouir*) that the imaginary produces with this technological torsion operated on images. In any case, we wonder whether this new statute of images modifies the perceptive phenomenon and how the symbolic can be reduced there, if not foreclosed, because of its digital nature. If what a digital image shows us is basically an image of the image, a pixelated construction of it, where the pigment of the paint and the grain of the photograph disappear, we may wonder about the impoverished eye of the beholder, whether it has observed something other than the representation of the image, and not the image itself.

This is what virtual images offer us now through holograms, which allow the body to be digitally present somewhere it cannot be physically so. For example, it is possible for politicians to give speeches at events they cannot attend, or for people to organize concerts and performances by artists who have already died¹. The digital body becomes its digital image and loses all carnal consistency. It is an image of the body, as close to the reality of the body as possible, which makes us believe that the body is almost there. Lacan’s *make-believe* semblant category is applicable in this example. Incidentally, here we find the operational ability of the opposition between semblant and real that Jacques-Alain Miller ([1991-92] 2002) pointed out in Lacan’s latest teaching: the digital body and its images tend to their nature as semblant, forcing us to tell a real image from a virtual one, where the former is different from the real in Lacan.

THE WALL OF SCREENS

In his book, which is essential for this question, Wajcman uses this expression and points out the importance of what he calls “the wall of images” (2010), which constitute an “object of the 21st century” in their control, information, observation, security, advertising, or simply spectacular nature (Wajcman, 2010, p. 67). Why does Wajcman speak of a “wall” here? Because beyond the multiplication and accumulation of images (let us think about the photos we gather in our computer memories, in “hard disks”, or in “clouds”, which we never look at again: the end of the photo album), the superimposition and posting of images on social media networks, we can no longer speak of a quantitative explosion of images, but rather of a frame that now structures our relation to reality. Reality has become an image of the image itself. The original is the film image, the images we send on social media networks, and its copy of reality seeking to imitate that original more or less accurately. Images have separated us from “reality” for some time now and they have in fact become a wall through the use of their digitalization, which already separates us from this reality. A mosaic of images projected to the infinite separates us from reality and this wall has become reality “itself”. But this wall is also an infinite window, the way in which Le Corbusier replaced the wall with the window in the early 20th century. A window which is supposed to allow us to observe the reality that declines in this very wall and which translates the ambition of science to see it all, as well as the triumph—in some way—of the omnipotence of the gaze. *Full Vision*: this “universal eye”, as Wajcman calls it, this civilization of the gaze implies being set free from the perspective really awarded to the human eye by its true power. A flat construction takes its place, liberated in principle from all obstacles, opening to a 360° view, with a depth of field equivalent to zero raised to infinity in all directions.

A worldwide network of cameras makes up this wall, giving shape to the phantasm of a technically-feasible, real-time, permanent surveillance and *omnivision*. This globalization of the gaze accompanies that of the market and hardly knows any other restraint than those areas which are voluntarily suppressed from the virtual menu for security reasons. But everything is, from now on, transparent to the gaze. And that is, therefore, the shape that the contemporary Master takes today. The Master says it can see us to the limit of intimacy, where it stops, but where other cameras might take over. All would be visible and, as a result, foreseeable. This is the illusion, as Wajcman (2010) points out, which the successive financial, climate, health, and—why not—political crises come to deny: we can actually see nothing. We believe we can see because the real is permanently monitored, but nothing, or very little, can be explained. Here neurosciences are almost the paradigm of this impasse, when by explaining to us that what can be observed in the brain is the cause, they do nothing but substitute an effect for the cause itself. It is the scientific fraud of making us believe that the effect is the cause itself. Jacques Lacan was more honest when he talked about the analytic fraud, since the symbolic does not succeed in reducing the real. Here it is believed that what is observed as a consequence of what is ignored becomes that which is ignored. Nobody notices these cameras in any enormous room, which would be the central observation post. We are made to believe that *Big Brother is watching you*, when *Big Brother* is actually the device itself. There are algorithms that observe “risky movements”, for example, in London’s subway system or in some cities. But it is a panoptic power device, although there are no eyes to see it, which translates a political will to see it all, where *technosciences* collaborate with that which is political in this sense.

“YOU HAVE SEEN NOTHING IN HIROSHIMA...”

We look in order not to see, because we do not want to see. Wajcman (2010) takes up the famous sentence in Marguerite Duras’s novel in order to show that despite the enchanting repetition of the images of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, as well as the successive crises that science has not been able to predict (the 2008 financial crisis, the political crisis that almost removed Greece from Europe in 2008, the recent *Brexit*, the

climate crises that are just beginning), paradoxically, nobody sees anything in the current world: the more cameras there are, the less we see. “You see nothing on the transparent wall of images,” seems to be saying today’s *omni-voyeur* world.

What could not stop affecting the statute of the word, if it is not indeed because of a devaluation of the word itself, is that we increasingly believe in what images show. We find an alienation of truth in the image as an illustration of a cause, which is intended more and more real, disconnected from all determining symbolic causality, which the term *subject* condenses in human sciences.

Marguerite Duras herself, in a meaty dialogue with Jean-Luc Godard in 1979 (but how many others preceded her! Heidegger with the word “in the information age” in the 1950s, Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man* in 1969) already pointed out “as screens are completed infected by a degraded word, a degraded discourse, completely antinomic of a true word. A word antinomic of the word: the word of political commerce, the word of propaganda” (Duras & Godard, 2014, p. 24). Duras stressed that the word of film language is also inscribed in this register. A word that is sold, which tries to sell images. When Alain Resnais was about to make the film of his novel—Duras added—the “first speaking film in cinema,” he said that all the others before his were flooded with an empty word. Resnais had begged her, “Please, don’t make any differences between what you write and what I ask you. He was the only one who could accept that and, even more so, ask for it. Starting a film about the world’s biggest catastrophe by ‘You have seen nothing in Hiroshima.’ While the whole world was already flooded with photographs and images” (Duras & Godard, p. 33).

And Duras, who made films later, also sought, through long silent sequences, with only music accompanying images, to give shape to words and silence in films. Re-injecting words into films, or giving images their full expression. In those years, films could still be made that way; some directors (Tarkovski, Bergman, Fassbinder, Kurosawa) could afford to offer us a festival of images and words. Even a Guy Debord, who in *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni* (1978), seeks to annoy the audience’s eye without making any complacent concessions to the gaze, going against the grain of what *The Society of the Spectacle* (Debord, 1967) proposed as images. What can be said about commercial films, which must adapt to a protocol dictated by an anxious timing, keep the audience on the edge of their seats throughout the film, and match the images to an account pre-formatted by simple and pleasant storytelling? The market and producers dictate the norm that determines not only the simplicity of images, but also the screenplay itself.

All that remains, therefore, is to give images their honor back: it appears that this will not be possible in a civilization that has degraded the value of words and will not be able to re-sweeten them in a *reverse* preciousness seeking to extol them again, or in a baroque movement with the intention of giving life to a language already uninhabited by the being.

¹ In France’s 2017 presidential campaign, some candidates actually used this procedure, and a concert by the popular artist Claude François, who died several years ago, was successfully organized a few months ago.

REFERENCES

- Benjamin, W. (1936 [2017]). *La obra de arte en la época de su reproductibilidad técnica*. Buenos Aires: La marca editora.
- Duras, M. & Goddard, J. (2014). *Dialogues*. París: Post-Edition.
- Lacan, J. (1949 [1997]). “El Estadio del espejo como formador de la función del yo (je) tal como se nos revela en la experiencia psicoanalítica” en *Escritos I*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Siglo 21.
- Miller, J.A. (1991-1992 [2002]). *De la naturaleza de los semblantes*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Wajcman, G. (2010). *L’oeil absolu*. París: Denoel.

NEW IMAGINARY IN *FARMACOPORNOGRAPHY*'S TIMES

ROBERTO CORDERO *

ABSTRACT

The present work examines the treatment done in the work of Paul B. Preciado about the relationship between the imaginary register and the real, independent of its copulation with the symbolic. The imperative to *jouissance* and the fall of the Other in the *pharmacopornographic* order explodes the image of the Cartesian body, while at the same time makes possible new modes of *jouissance* that give consistency to the body. In this context, the contra-sexual practices are proposed as a field to investigate an imaginary that establishes meaning.

KEYWORDS

New imaginary | Body | *Pharmacopornographic* | Contra-sexual

“The truth of sex is not revelation, it’s sex design”
(Preciado, 2008 [2014] p.36).

Towards the end of the *Seminar XXIII* (Lacan, 1975-1976 [2015]), Lacan proposes an orientation by the real as a new bet for psychoanalysis. Since the real forcludes the meaning, an orientation by the real makes psychoanalysis no more than a “short circuit that passes through the meaning” (p.120). How to think this passage through the meaning? Lacan gives an indication: “it is necessary to crash, if I may say so, against a new imaginary that establishes the meaning” (p.120).

In the eighth class of this seminar, meaning is defined as the copulation between language and one’s own body, that is, the symbolic with the imaginary. Such articulation between both registers took different forms along Lacan’s teaching. When the imaginary sutures the hiatus caused by the tongue cutting over the flesh, and operates by veiling the *trieb* objects in the field of the Other, it is possible to locate the imaginary register subordinated to the symbolic. A similar articulation is shown in the developments about optical scheme in *Seminar I* (Lacan, 1953-1954 [2013]), when the coherence of the virtual image as gestalt that orders the real, depends on its articulation with the Ideal anchored in the field of the Other. In both cases the sense is established from the symbolic. So, how to think a new imaginary that establishes the meaning, to sustain an orientation by the real? This question leads to investigate the relationship between the imaginary register with the real, independent of its copulation with the symbolic register.

To delve into this relationship, Indart (Tudanca, Gil, Gorenberg and Rodríguez de Milano, 2017) proposes to take into account two references. On the one hand, the real image in the optical scheme, that which remains as “a necessary rest in the physics of that model” (Tudanca et al, 2017, p.143) so that, in a second time, the virtual image can be knotted into the field of the Other.

*Centro de Día Psicoanalítico #4
roberto.cordero.j@gmail.com

This first reference would be useful to interrogate how the imaginary could be sustained without that later moment of anchorage in the symbolic, that is, how the real image would operate independently. On the other hand, he proposes to return to the Freudian notion of narcissistic libido, opposed to the object libido. For Indart, the imaginary is not articulated to the body for orient it in the “external world” situating objects, ends and goals, but to give rise to “something of the life body opaque *jouissance*” (Tudanca et al, 2017, p. 139). This would have as effect to inflate the body imaginary consistency. From both references, Indart concludes that a possible way of orienting oneself in this search implies for the contemporary psychoanalyst to be attentive at the *jouissance* that preserve the corporal imaginary and give consistency to the body, that is to say that are not the *object a* *jouissance*.

Present work intends to take in count this indication. For it, the work of Preciado -philosopher¹, queer activist and an international reference in gender studies, and body and sexuality policies- will be explored. Preciado proposes a deconstructivist reading of body production technologies in contemporary history, starting from the end of the Second World War. In this context, he describes capitalism development based in two major industries, the pharmacological and the pornographic, to look for “the traces of what is already the end of the body, as it has been defined by modernity” (Preciado, 2002, p.20). His description of the modes of consumption, *jouissance* circulation and bodies production reveals the symbolic precariousness to establish meaning, placed by Miller and Laurent (Miller and Laurent, 1996-1997 [2013]) as the Another that does not exist. At the same time, during his work, Preciado outlines a new notion of body that takes consistency in this deregulated circuit.

What can Preciado’s work teach to psychoanalysis about the modes of relation between the imaginary and real register, in contemporary times? What possible forms of body consistency does his work describes?

POTENTIAGAUDENDI

Preciado (2008 [2014]) proposes a concept to understand the body in relation to the capitalist circuit. There, the body is inscribed as an “orgasmic force” or *potentiagaudendi* that circulates - at the same time that it is produced - in that production-consumption circuit. This definition is taken from the philosophical notion of “power to act or force to exist” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.41) elaborated by Spinoza (2000) and implies the conjunction of “somatic and psychic forces” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.41) in a constant movement that “transforms the world into pleasure-with” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.41). This force is characterized by its indeterminate capacity, by not recognizing the symbolic oppositions, nor the differences between subject and object, nor the possibilities of “being excited, excited or excited-with”. Nor is it something that can be possessed, conserved or assigned to belonging, that is, there is no possibility to identificate this power as one’s own or of another. For Preciado, “*potentiagaudendi* exists only as an event, relationship, practice, becoming” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.42).

If this *potentia* only exists and is produced as circulation, the living body is defined as its substrate. Therefore, the body can not be understood as a prediscursive biological basis, outside the circuits of production. The body itself is configured as an effect of the circulation and production of *potentiagaudendi* in the capitalist circuit. It could be said that, for Preciado, the body is the consistency of a constant force, unreachable by the symbolic and set to circulate without any regulation.

For Preciado, the capitalist circuit stands in a continuous and unlimited cycle of excitement-frustration, supported by technoscience. For this reason, the pharmacological and pornographic industry are its representatives par excellence, to the point that Preciado names them as “*pharmacopoenographic order*” (Preciado, 2008 [2014]). In this context, he conceptualizes a

body that is produced as a commodity in which technoscience inscribes his fantasies. The notion of body that emerges from the concept of *potentiagaudendi* is a product of the relationship of the living with a circuit of unlimited excitement-frustration. The objects and images that the *pharmacopornographic* order puts to circulate without any type of symbolic mediation have effects on the consistency of the body. This allows Preciado to think a body in which not only the limits of the skin are diluted, but it also explodes the limits of biological-synthetic, human-prosthesis, organ-function, subject-object. Viagra, for example, is not a supplement that improves a pure and deficient natural body, it could be the production of an eternally young body, starting from the inscription in the flesh of a fantasy of unlimited sexual potency, while makes millions of dollars. Or the one to produce sportsmen-machines that do not feel the limits of the lack of oxygen in the height. Likewise, after Viagra, it will not only have sex with the reproductive organ, or it will play football with feet and lungs: the circulatory system will have a new function.

PROTHESIS

Preciado appeals to the notion of prosthesis to think how the capitalist circuit done consistency to the body. She traces its genealogy in the Aristotelian concept of *organon*, which “designates the instrument or piece that, together with other pieces, is necessary to carry out some regulated process” (Preciado, 2002, p.128). *Organon* is a necessary element of *techné* (technique) to facilitate an activity and, therefore, condenses knowledge, norms and modes of relationships from which reality can be apprehended. From this definition, Preciado say that the notion of “organ” has nothing to do with the living, but with the idea of technological prosthesis.

Prosthesis represents the way in which the technique appropriates the flesh and reconfigures the body each time it is used. Upon entering into action, the prosthesis strengthens the body, making it more productive according to the demands of the market. At the same time, it introduces the knowledge and modes of relations that the *pharmacopoenographic* order imposes, creating bodies to the measure of their fantasies. Google Maps allows you to navigate in any unknown place and perform accurate displacement calculations. After this App, the sense of orientation, time and space will be strange to the off-line state. In *Embrillos del cuerpo* (Miller et al, 1999 [2016]) it locates a clinical case in which a patient is destabilized when her doctor suppressed- from one day to the next- the medication she used for fifteen years. The drug called “Pondéral. Prolonged action” operates as an element that orders a body for that particular *parlêtre*. In terms of Preciado, it is possible to capture the prosthesis function there. If the prosthesis emerges as that which made possible to reinsert a body into the productive process -generating at the same time a new consumer- it also models the body image giving access to new modes of *jouissance*. Preciado’s notion of prosthesis presents the potential to model the image at the same time as it explodes the image of the Cartesian body. The prosthesis not only questions the organ-function relationship, but also makes each object a possible organ. The external-internal pair unfolds and with it the idea of belonging and possession also falls. To treat the concept of prosthesis, Preciado appeals to the use of the silicone dildo in sexual practices, indicating that this object questions the erogenous limits of the Modernity’s body. In this way, dildo

(...) comes to question the idea that the flesh limits coincide with the body limits. Thus, the distinction between sensible subject and inanimate object is disturbed. By being able to separateit self from the body, dildo resists the force with which the body appropriates for itself the pleasure, as if it were something that comes from the body itself. The pleasure that the dildo provides, belongs to the body only insofar as it is re-appropriation. (Preciado, 2002p.70)

CONTRASEXUALITY

In the same movement in which the *pharmacopoenographic* order explodes the Modernity body, new possible ways emerge to give it consistency. Not only biotechnology, prosthetic and surgical techniques make a “new appearance of nature” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.154) when are combined with representations coming from cinema or architecture. Pornography is also a body production technology.

According to Preciado, it is a source of image production that - in the words of Linda Williams - becomes a body. In his work, pornography would be a masturbatory device that produces “the visual illusion of the irruption in the pure real” (Preciado, 2008 [2014], p.204), activating mechanisms of excitement outside the will of the spectator, des -subjecting whoever looks. In this sense, it could be thought from psychoanalysis that the consumer of pornography is reduced to being gaze object, as Lacan (Lacan, 1964 [2003]) is included in the painting, in front of the can floating in the sea. However, taking up the Indart’s work (Tudanca et al, 2017), this aspect of pornography would not be the most convenient to study how a “new imaginary” is articulated. There Indart opposes the phenomenon of selfies, which could teach about the way in which for somebody the opaque *jouissance* of the body takes consistency in the image. Some *parlêtre* can, from the treatment of their body image in social networks, articulate an order in which register themselves. That is, establish meaning from the relationship between the imaginary and the real. Faced of this technology -which print the heterocentrated fantasies in the bodies, while pushing towards the *pharmacopornographic* imperative to masturbatory *jouissance*- Preciado proposes another practice. Contrasexuality as queer resistance practice would be a different way of treating the body. For the contrasexuality, the body is a platform of resistance and political action in which it is possible to intervene -with the technologies of the *pharmacopoenographic* order- subverting what is proposed as “natural order”. If the queer movement appropriates an insult that indicates the abject, to reintroduce that waste as a potential for political subversion, in contrasexuality the same logic is played, but with the flesh at stake.

Contrasexuality promotes a particular treatment of the no sexual relationship. For this movement, “bodies recognize themselves not as men or women, but as talking bodies” (Preciado, 2002, p.18) that can shake the heteronormative ghosts intervening in the real without veils. These operated or transformed bodies, or their apparently monstrous sexual practices in the view of the heteronormative order, open the way to nominations, collectives, movements that in some cases make possible some inscription in the field of the Other. As Fajnwaks (2013) indicates, “what is at stake in queer cultures is the search for a nomination from a privileged way of sexual *jouissance*, outside of a norm founded on gender” (p.99).

Among the aspects of the imaginary-real relationship that can be captured in these aspects of the work of Preciado, it is possible to take at least three points. In first place, and in line with Miller (1989-1990 [2011]) places in *El banquete de los analistas*, in the capitalist circuit, the reality is not supported on to the ghost -as it happens in the master discourse-. There, the excess of unregulated *jouissance* is supported on reality as such, that is, the ghost becomes real. In the *pharmacopornographic* order, fantasies become flesh, and this disarms the Cartesian body that, through thought, founded the inner-outer pair to keep reality at a convenient distance. The imperative to *jouissance* would not preserve the Cartesian body imaginary.

Secondly, although in the proliferation of technologies and medias in *pharmacopoenographic* order, a fertile field is opened up to diverse possible knots between the imaginary and the real, Preciado’s analysis does not always seem enough to specify when it is at stake a treatment of the opaque body *jouissance* by way of the image, or when the imaginary treatment is in relation to the deregulated *jouissance* excess outside the body.

Finally, in the course of Preciado, contrasexual practices could possibly be taken as a fertile field to investigate how, in some cases, meaning is established by the imaginary register, in relation to a *jouissance* that gives consistency to the body.

¹ In January 2015, as a political act of queer resistance, Paul B. Preciado decided to leave behind the name with which he had been registered in the Civil Registry, and with which he had signed his three books published until these moment: Beatriz Preciado. "Every time someone calls me 'Paul' erases with me what the normative genre wanted to do with me" (Curia, June 5, 2015), says this philosopher and activist. In the present work, both grammar genres are written when Preciado is qualified, because when he/she speaks of him/herself, makes it indistinctly each time.

REFERENCES

- Curia, D. (5 de Junio de 2015). "La importancia de llamarse Paul" en *Página 12*. Disponible en: <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/soy/1-4022-2015-06-06.html>
- Fajnwaks, F (2013). «Cultures queer: altérité et homosexualités» en *Elles ont choisi. Les homosexualités féminines*. París: Editions Michéle.
- Lacan, J. (1953-1954 [2013]). " Los escritos técnicos de Freud " en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 1*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (1964 [2003]). " Los cuatro conceptos fundamentales del psicoanálisis " en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 11*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Lacan, J. (1975-1976 [2015]). " El sinthome " en *El seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 23*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (1989-1990 [2011]). *El banquete de los analistas*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. & Laurent, E. (1996-1997 [2013]). *El Otro que no existe y sus comités de ética*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.A. (1999 [2016]). *Embrollos del cuerpo*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Preciado, B. (2002). *Manifiesto contra-sexual*. Madrid: Ópera prima.
- Preciado, B. (2008 [2014]). *Testo yonqui. Sexo, drogas y biopolítica*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Spinoza, B. (2000). *Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico*. Madrid: Trotta.
- Tudanca, L., Gil, P., Gorenberg, R., Rodriguez, G. (2017). *Lo imaginario en Lacan*. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.

IT IS NECESSARY TO CRASH...

FLORENCIA MINA *

RESUMEN

Based on the approach of the new imaginary introduced in the Seminar XXIII by Lacan, this essay hopes to demonstrate some differences with respect to the first Lacanian imaginary in order to shed light on the rules of this record in the present school. From there, I propose a hypothesis on how writing has influenced Alejandra Pizarnik's life, taking into account the paradigmatic example of James Joyce's invention with his work of art.

PALABRAS CLAVES

Imaginary | Sinthome | Body | Writing

If only I could live in a continual state of ecstasy, shaping
the body of the poem with my own, rescuing every phrase with
my days and weeks, imbuing the poem with my breath while feeding
the letters of its every word into the offering in this ceremony of living.
Alejandra Pizarnik, *A Musical Hell*

INTRODUCTION

The present work aims at detecting the changes that take place and/or continuities that are maintained in terms of the conceptualization of the new imaginary, which is the selected topic for this new edition of *Lapso*.

The idea of a “new imaginary” presupposes the idea that something has been left behind. It is necessary to return to the first Lacanian imaginary in order to shed light on the rules of this record in a new school that does not contradict itself with the previous one but that challenges the Lacanian premise that explains most of his teachings, referring to the symbolic as the fundamental record that assigns meaning.

Some questions arise which take us to evaluate the outcomes of the mirror stage since, this starting point, will guide our reading about the last Lacan's reflections on it, in which the imaginary takes a special place.

Based on these concepts that frame my work, I will propose a hypothesis concerning the purpose of writing of the Argentine poet Alejandra Pizarnik, focusing on the special place that writing had in the life of James Joyce; an attempt at poetry regarding the approach to this new imaginary which Lacan invites us to think together with Joyce and his explanations about the *sinthome*.

*Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
florenciamina@hotmail.com

FROM THE BODY AS AN IMAGE TO A NEW IMAGINARY

In his book *Ecrits 1*, Lacan (2010 [1949]) proposes that in the mirror stage, the *enfant* recognizes his external image when he looks himself at a mirror, which allows him to integrate his body sensations into the imago. This image is perceived joyfully by the *enfant* since it gives rise to a perception of selfhood, to a unified image. In other words, it is an image that provides stability to a reality lived by the subject as chaotic. However, it does not exist a sudden relation between the body and his image. It is necessary that something comes to join what at the beginning is presented as loose.

Laurent (2002) claims that the subject feels joy when he sees himself at a mirror but, mysteriously, he cannot recognize himself until he looks at his father or the person who is holding him and it is from that look that he recognizes this image as his own. In other words, there is an external point, a point that does not belong to the order of the image to determine the imaginary relation. This is why the mirror stage is a device that makes the wording of the primary narcissism possible, by joining it with the Other.

I believe that this key text reveals the first idea of a subject whose body is recognized through an imaginary identification coming from the symbolic. This is so because it is someone else who gives a body; the subject is not alone.

According to Miller (2012), it is from this first idea that the subject has an imaginary which, for Lacan, is basically scopic because the body is the shape of the body, not the enjoyable substance. This concept is introduced later with the *parlêtre*. In other words, what can be seen is the image; the subject experiences a change in mood when he recognizes his own image but he will never know anything about what goes on inside his body. This will remain a mystery.

Therefore, if we keep on reading about Lacan's last reflections on this topic, we will find some differences in his teachings. He will start thinking about the subject in relation to his body: a body changed by language in the first place. What J-A-Miller calls speaking body. Laurent (May, 2016) suggests that the speaking body is the center of attention in Lacan's last teaching suggestions because he wants to find something that goes beyond the unconscious. He introduces us to a body that enjoys, a body that is marked by passions and strong affection: an instinct-driven body. The importance here is not his image nor his shape as in the first teaching, but the pleasure he feels because of the language he speaks.

We can notice here a change in the imaginary order. According to Bassols (2017), even though the subject gets his first pleasurable effect in the body through the image, that effect will only be experienced once he finds himself immersed in the language. The language is a key factor in this body modification process understood as an enjoyable substance. The image will be, from now on, an enigma to decipher in each body.

To paraphrase Bassols (2015), what is real about the language is what gives body to the image. However, this will never take place if the body is not touched first by the language, which allows the three structures (real, symbolic and imaginary) to knot.

The consequences on this change of perspective in Lacan's teachings let us elucidate that the image alone is not enough to achieve stability. This stability will be based on the relation between the *parlêtre* and his body which is, according to Miller (2013), imaginary.

However, what does this relation between the *parlêtre* and his body mean? And, why is this stability imaginary?

As stated by Lacan (1975/76 [2008]), affection is the only relation that the *parlêtre* has with his body and this relation implies self-love:

Self-love is the principle of imagination. The *parlêtre* adores his body because he believes he owns it. In fact, he does not, but his body is his only consistency- mental consistency of course, because his body runs away at every instant (Lacan, 1975/76 [2008] p.64)

It is in this belief about having a body to adore that Lacan finds the root of the imaginary.

Apart from that, the imaginary consistency holds it together and it is for this reason that it is symbolized as the surface. It has the capacity of forming the knot, but it is not the knot itself. The knot exists to the rope. In other words, a *sine qua non* condition of this consistency is that there has to exist a previous tie.

Regarding the body, Miller (2013) states that it is the only consistency of the *parlêtre*. If there is to be a body, a knot has to e-xist because this is the basis of the body's imaginary consistency. "It Is Necessary to Crash...", the title of this research paper, makes reference to the new imaginary that Lacan (1975/76 [2008]) discusses in his *Seminar XXIII. A compass to guide us to the rules of the imaginary in the new conceptualization of the parlêtre*:

It is necessary to crash, if I can say it in this way, into a new imaginary that establishes the sense (...) the sense as it is; the one that I defined, not long ago, in terms of the union between the language, since I place the unconscious there, and our own body. (Lacan, 1975/76, [2008] p. 120).

Here I believe that Lacan argues about a necessary clash between language and body. This clash will leave a mark on the body, joyful experiences. The new imaginary comes to establish the sense, providing consistency for those marks. According to Miller (2013), Lacan refers to the *sinthome* as the consistency of those signs; this is why the *sinthome* is defined as a body event.

Having these statements in mind, we can spot the relation between the new imaginary and the *sinthome* regarding not only consistency but also self-love. This is so since the consistency is based on the relation that the *parlêtre* has with his body. This relation or this sense of belonging with the body relies on the belief of having it in order to adore it.

JOYCE, PIZARNIK AND WRITING...

Writing interests me, since I think that, historically, it is by little pieces of writing that we have entered into the real.
Lacan. *Seminar XXIII*

I would like to start with a question: what does the writing of the ego in Joyce have to do with the new imaginary?

According to Lacan (1975/76 [2008]), Joyce did a good job as a writer and writing is essential to his ego; the ego comes to fix something: he calls it mistake, lack, lapse. He fixes that lack of relation with his body; the relation we were talking about, one whose function is to provide imaginary consistency to a body.

Lacan considers that it is possible to notice in Joyce's writings this particular relation or lack of it with his body. For example, there is a scene in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in which one of the characters, Stephen, is attacked by some of his mates; and he affirms, without any doubts, that it is not Stephen the one who is beaten up but Joyce himself. Lacan is interested in this descriptive passage when Joyce abandons his body: "there is something in Joyce that is begging to leave, to be removed like a peel" (Lacan, 1975/76, [2008] p. 147)

This metaphor of something being removed like a peel refers to the relation that Joyce has with

his own body. What is surprising is that Joyce does not feel anything when his mates hit him, he does not even try to defend himself. He says that it was quickly forgotten: the image fades away, it disappears.

This leads us to our first conclusion, Joyce's relation with his body is not a relation that has to do with the image:

If the ego is said to be narcissistic, it is indeed because there is something at a certain level that supports the body as an image. However, in Joyce's case the image is not concerned here; so, doesn't this show that the ego has a very particular function on him? (Lacan, 1975/76, [2008] p.147).

Laurent (2002) will state that this relation does not have to do with the image as in the mirror stage where it is linked to affection and from there the psychic is imagined. Joyce's relation with the hole is a narcissistic one, that is, his relation with the lack of image and with that that makes a hole in the body. This is so, following what I was saying, the real of the language.

That relation which allows the *parlêtre* to take possession of his own body is one that Joyce achieves because of the construction of that ego turning to writing. Based on Joyce's writings, Lacan postulates a new school, the school of the *sinthome*; a school that will aim at the creation of each individual in the first place.

The creation in Joyce, his knowledge of creating a body through writing, is what allows him to fix the lack of the Name of the Father. It allows him to have a fourth knot or component which Lacan calls *sinthome*, whose function is to tie the three structures (Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real). Moreover, regarding the new imaginary, it allows him to show consistency to that sense of belonging to a body, which gives rise to self-love.

Let me start with this paradigmatic example, the one of Joyce and his writing, in order to question the place that writing had in the life of the Argentinian poet, Alejandra Pizarnik. She was fond of psychoanalysis and she had James Joyce's writings among her favorite ones on her night table. Over a period of time, Pizarnik was seeing the psychoanalyst León Ostrov to whom she dedicates one of her books, "*La última Inocencia*", and to whom she sent letters when she was living in Paris. Her constant search through writing allows us to suggest that it exists, in each of her poems, the desire to calm her feeling of death, a feeling that penetrates into her prose. However, she leaved us not only her collection of poems, but also her *Diaries* (2010) where she expresses her everyday experiences in a harsh way:

Sometimes, I would like to capture myself in writing with my body and soul; account for my breath, my cough, my fatigue, but in such a perfectly exact way that you will hear me breathing, coughing, crying, if only I could cry... (Pizarnik 2010, p.63)

In this book, the following topics come up: the complexes about her body, her difficulties in the sexual field, her yearning for writing a novel (something that she could never fulfilled), her thirst for knowledge, her loneliness and her existential angst that runs through each of her pages: "they don't know what it is to cry in front of a blank piece of paper and, patiently, fill it with signs created by myself" (Pizarnik, *Diaries*, 2010, p. 57)

I ask myself what Alejandra was searching for; in comparison with Joyce, it looks like there is not a narcissist relation with writing in Pizarnik. Joyce writes about making holes in the body, about the real of the language. This assures him a relation with pleasure.

According to Laurent (2002), melancholy is the accentuation of sadness. There, we will find the death of the chain of the signifier, of a direct relation not with the body but with the chain of the signifier alone, "the signifier does not have any relation with the forms of pleasure and the living, while Joyce's identification allows him to continue laughing when he writes" (Laurent, 2002, p.83).

Joyce shows us that it is possible to move from a lack to a *sinthome* through his writing. This “continue laughing” that allows Joyce to experience pleasure when he finds himself plunged into writing means the link between the chain of the signifier and the real of the body; this does not occur in the melancholy where the Name of the Father, which is a guarantee of pleasure, is foreclosed.

“A desire to write like James Joyce drunk” (Pizarnik, 2016, p.40) reads some of her lines in her writing books. We can see her frustrated longing to write a novel when she speaks of Joyce’s novel as “a kind of portrait of the young artist, novel that should reflect myself and my circumstances” (Pizarnik, *Diaries*, 2016, p.94).

I will take a risk and say, as a kind of hypothesis, that one of her quests through writing was “crashing” into the hole that emerges from the crash between the real of the language and an emotionally-driven body, crashing to leave a mark on that body that has passions and to possess it:

If only I could live in a continual state of ecstasy, shaping the body of the poem with my own, rescuing every phrase with my days and weeks, imbuing the poem with my breath while feeding the letters of its every word into the offering in this ceremony of living. (Pizarnik, 1971, p. 73).

“It is Necessary to Crash”, as I said, with the new imaginary that gives consistency to the body; Joyce did it, his know-how was that; maybe Pizarnik’s know-how did not carry the name of *sinthome*, if we understand it as a body event connected to narcissism and self-love; but without doubts with her writing she has exorcize more than one of her evils and also, with Joyce, it remains as an enigma that does not stop to question ourselves.


REFERENCES

- Bassols, M. (2016). “Cuerpo de la imagen y cuerpo hablante”. *X Congreso de la Asociación Mundial de Psicoanálisis*. Disponible en: <http://www.congressoamp2016.com/pagina.php?area=8&pagina=38&lang=en&lang=es>
- Lacan, J. (1966 [2007]). “El estadio del espejo como formador de la función del yo (je) tal como se nos revela en la experiencia psicoanalítica” en *Escritos I*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Lacan, J. (1975-1976 [2008]). “El sinthome” en *El Seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 23*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Laurent, E. (2016). “El cuerpo hablante: El inconsciente y las marcas de nuestras experiencias de goce”. *Lacan Cotidiano*. Disponible en http://www.eol.org.ar/la_escuela/Destacados/Lacan-Quotidien/LC-cero-576.pdf
- Laurent, E. (2002). *Los objetos de la pasión*. Buenos Aires: Tres Haches.
- Miller, J.-A. (2013). *Piezas sueltas*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2011). *Sutilezas analíticas*. Buenos Aires: Paidós
- Pizarnik, A. (2010). *Diarios*. Barcelona: Lumen
- Pizarnik, A. (2016). *Diarios*. Barcelona: Lumen.
- Pizarnik, A. (1971 [2013]). *El infierno musical*. Barcelona: Lumen.
- Tudanca, L. (2017). *Lo Imaginario en Lacan*. Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.

INTERVIEW WITH BABY NOVOTNY

BABY NOVOTNY *

By Jorge Assef



[CLICK TO PLAY](#)

*Psychoanalyst (AME) of the Lacanian Orientation School (EOL) and the World Association of Psychoanalysis.

THE BODY, IMAGE QUEEN IN THE HISTORY OF ART

MARCELO NUSENOVICH* & DAVID ALBANO GONZÁLEZ **

RESUMEN

The hypothesis in this essay is to consider the body as Sovereign Image in the history of art. The concept of “Sovereign Image” is proposed by Jacques-Alain Miller as an element of the imaginary register of language experience which equates it with the master signifier in the register of the symbolic.

PALABRAS CLAVES

Sovereign Image | Body | History of art

The power of symbols in culture and in the minds of men and women is not rooted only in its duality¹ and in its capacity to express the inexpressible; its performativity or its “symbolic efficacy” lies, above all, in the possibility of presenting that which is contingent or imaginary as obvious, necessary, and unavoidable.

That competence to present as natural that which is, at least partially, imaginary is a particular evidence of the body. This is so much so that nobody doubts its “biological” nature, its very existence, and the experience of the body is far from the different operations which society or culture have performed—and still perform—on that body. In the style of what Marcel Mauss thought of as “techniques of the body” in the 1930s, a concept which would be taken up by Michel Foucault (1975 [1991]) and his idea of the body as the meeting place for power relations and knowledge. That is where the vision of the industrial revolution and capitalism building a body specifically made for the machine and for discipline—also demanded by the national state in the battlefields—originates.

After these general considerations, in this essay we will present different fragmentary situations in the history of art, articulating their methods and approaches with those of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The conjuncture will be provided by the concept “Sovereign Image”, in the sense that is given to this expression by Jacques-Alain Miller (1995 [1998]), when he proposes this syntagma as that element of the imaginary register which could be equated with the “master signifier” in the symbolic register.

Although signifiers are not characterized by occupying a privileged place—we rather speak of equality of the signifiers which are defined by opposition and which are susceptible of metaphor and metonymy—it is by an analytical operation that a signifier is characterized as master, unsuccessfully representing the subject. The subject is an effect of the movement of the chain; it is not an individual, a person, but a subject of the unconscious that is represented by a signifier,

* CePIA (Arts Research and Production Center) | SECyT

mnusenovich@gmail.com

** CIECS (CONICET and UNC)

davidalbanogonzalez@gmail.com

for another signifier. If the master signifier is the main element of the symbolic register, the Sovereign Image will be the main element of the imaginary register.

The expression has its difficulties, as Miller explains, because the same movement of proposing it as an element of the imaginary requires its *significantization*. In psychoanalysis, an image reigns when it acquires a symbolic status. The same could be said in general of those objects or situations to which the history of art has directed its attention. However, while it is obvious that images abound in the history of art, the Sovereign Image has its own characteristics which make it different from the signifier, the main one being that it does not represent the subject.

The Sovereign Image is coordinated with *jouissance*. It is that in which the imaginary is tied to *jouissance*. This is what can be read as an example in Freud's text (1936 [2008]) *Letter to Romain Rolland (A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis)* where he relates an effect of subjective division experienced by himself when he arrived and saw the Acropolis for the first time: he says that there was in him a person who knew that the Acropolis really existed and, at the same time, another person who seemed to doubt it.

In psychoanalysis, the images that dominate can be enumerated, and Miller (1995 [1998]) summarizes them in three in *Elucidation of Lacan*: 1. one's own body, 2. the body of the Other, and 3. the phallus. We suggest reading this text to delve into the concept of the Sovereign Image.

This essay aims to take Miller's hypothesis to the field of art history, as a game, as a bet, but as a serious matter, to address some Sovereign Images in art over the centuries.

In his text, Miller begins this game and ventures that the prevailing image in Greek antiquity is the face. The Greek word for face is *prosopon* and it designates that which we present to the eye, more precisely "in front of the face or mask." In Latin it is the origin of the term "person." *Prosopon*, then, is in opposition to the rest of the body, which is always more or less dressed, not given to the naked eye.

It was the face in ancient Greece, but what are the Sovereign Images which tied a *jouissance* in the subjectivities of other eras? We will try to give some answers in the following sections.

JOUISSANCE IN THE ETERNAL PRESENT: HUNTING

The first bodily representations come from prehistoric caves, almost always coexisting with those of animals. It can be said that the body of the latter, much more powerful than the human, is the Sovereign Image in that timeless period.

When the artist and magician paints the animal, he does it in a formidable scale and with a realism in the representation of movement which was admired by European artists since the late nineteenth century. That does not happen with the human body in the same period, when its representation is simple and schematic.

Art is mixed here—as on many other occasions—with magic and the supernatural. Animals, on which they depended for their sustenance and clothing, is identified with the power of nature and, therefore, with the divine and the inexplicable (Giedon, 1981 [1985]). Capturing the image is hunting the animal and also appropriating its vital energy. This is attested to by the arrows painted on their bodies; many times, there are hints of real tips which pierce the image of the beast that has been wounded to death. His superiority places the hunter in a situation of veneration and admiration for his object of desire, which apparently contradicts his intention to kill it. However, it is in fact a ritual sacrifice related to spirits, diffuse at first, which would be later crystallized symbolically in the zoomorphic deities of the first civilizations such as Egypt,

Mesopotamia, or America. After the death of the animal, the process of its (in)corporation begins, through its flesh and the skin that covers its body. We also know Freud's myth about the primal horde and the totem feast: it is thanks to the incorporation of the meat of the dead totem animal that its qualities are acquired; in other words, it is thanks to the identification with the symbol which kills the thing that its significant and imaginary properties are introjected.



Hunting Scene (unknown artist), Lascaux Cave (France).
Cave painting, circa 17,000-15,000 B.C.


Let's take as an example the so-called "Hunting Scene" in the cave of Lascaux (France). What predominates is the enormous body of the injured animal, which at the same time writhes in pain and attacks its victimizer. Its head turns desperately toward the open wound in its abdomen, through which its viscera hang. However, it will crush the hunter, who is falling in the represented scene. His body is reduced to a few lines. His head has been replaced by that of a bird, perhaps a totem sign, an assumption reinforced by a cane which, whether contemporary with the scene or not, is a fact impossible to verify with precision; it is also an integral part of the scene or, in other words, it forms part of its history and meaning. The cane handle is also a bird. The Sovereign Image of the animal provides him with life and death, *jouissance* and pain. But also a symbolic notion of the body which places it in a situation of inferiority while allowing it to resolve the apparent opposition between the erotic and the thanatotic, since the image of the hunter is ithyphallic. Even the hunter's phallus points to the animal, as if pointing out where the phallic value can be found.

In this case, the Sovereign Image privileges the body... of the Other. Who else than nature, represented by the great animals, the immensity of the sky and the Earth, of the vegetation in its vast territories, could have occupied the place of the Other for the prehistoric caveperson? The body of the animal Other is that which is represented in Lascaux, in great detail and in superiority to that of the human body. An indomitable Other that, in that final moment of being hunted, that instant when its domination is achieved, also crushes the hunter.

THE NAKED MAN, A PERFECT MEASURE OF DESIRE: THE APOLLONIAN CANON

In classical times, the Sovereign Image of the body is an idea articulated with beauty lacking in materiality, since it is based on a god; Apollo and human perceptual mechanisms are not capable of contemplating it. Plato, although he recognized in eroticism a way to get to truth, distrusted the ability of the senses to grasp the reality of things, among them, their beauty, so linked to both Eros—and, therefore, to the body—and his mother, Aphrodite. And the idea of beauty lay in the male nude, which was not often pointed out from a gender perspective, since the canon, as we

said, was based on Apollo, god of supreme beauty (Clark, 1956 [1996]). When Polykleitos applied the rules of the system he had created in “The Canon”—now lost—to sculpture, he gave symbolic expression to the body of the male citizen (not the female citizen) independent but subordinate to the polis. Respecting the relationship of the parts with the whole or guiding idea, but without their losing their independence, is the founding principle of this poetics or organization of forms. This was articulated with a policy, or an order of forces in Athenian democracy, the obedience of all citizens to the polis, as interchangeable units, but without their losing their individuality. He manages to put into action the Apollonian Sovereign Image with the revolutionary invention of the *contrapposto*, a pose where Egyptian or Mesopotamian hieratic attitude is altered—societies based on permanence and not on change, unlike the classic, which is presented as a discontinuity—reaching the formal solution to a problem which can be found in the pre-Socratic philosophers of the sixth century B.C.: the relationship between stillness and movement, between that which remains and that which changes. This “vitality” and closeness to Apollo clearly lay in ephebes and not in women, since contrary to what one might think, the nude of the so-called “beautiful sex” appeared much later. This homoerotic canon has survived surreptitiously in the West, even in Christianity, as for example in the figure of Saint Sebastian. It was resurrected from antiquity and put back into force after the discovery of the “Apollo Belvedere” near the sea. The latter is a Hellenistic sculpture that was consecrated as the ideal of beauty in the eighteenth century by Winckelmann, the first thinker who applied scientific rules—mainly based on archeology—to the study of art history. It is no coincidence that this devotee of Greece was homosexual; neither is it that this fact has been generally overlooked by art history. However, the weight that his ideas had in the “cultured” West, his consecration of the ephebic body adjusted to Apollonian rules: a priori formal principles which might make it possible to explain its beauty and impact on the senses, as well as its possible resonance in the absolute idea of beauty. However, it is important to remember that Plato distrusted, above all, the most beautiful objects, since their unreal beauty distanced men from the contemplation of true perfection, which was obviously ideal.



Apollo Belvedere (unknown artist), Cortile Ottagono, Pio-Clementino Museum, Vatican City, circa 120.

The phallic logic, from psychoanalysis, is thought as that which privileges measure, symmetry, order, the rational and the countable. It is no coincidence that the epoch when the canon of beauty was male—through the idea of supreme beauty of the god Apollo—was governed by

parameters linked to the measurable as a technique to achieve the perfect representation of the body. The Sovereign Image in this period is then the male human body, founded on Apollo's unrepresentable beauty.

ENLIGHTENED VENUS

Venus–Aphrodite to the Greeks–was, as we know, the goddess of love in its carnal form. Always accompanied by Eros, she is also distinguished by other attributes, such as roses and a white dove. François Boucher (1703-1790), the favorite painter of the Marquise de Pompadour, who was an influential and enlightened lover of Louis XV, painted several portraits of her. The one we now present, “La toilette de Venus,” was painted in 1751 and can be clearly contrasted with another where she is portrayed in a wide skirt on which a book rests. Although the female reader is a Rococo genre related to the publishing *boom* and to what Chartier characterizes as an urban use of the printed image, it is remarkable that Jeanne, sponsor of the Encyclopedia, appears accompanied by a book. It is also notable that, in other representations such as this one, she appears personifying Venus, who is not related to the intellect (Boyme, 1987 [1994]). In addition to obvious contrasts related to issues of male domination, possession, and *voyeurism*–monarchical in this case–, it is worth noting, however, that both representations of Madame de Pompadour coincide at a certain point with the project of the Enlightenment, since erotic education was not absent from the program, as the Marquis de Sade’s work shows us, for example. It was an extraordinarily frank and bold century in its erotic practices and representations. That is why it can be thought that this allegory brings to the scene a promise of carnal *jouissance* intimately linked to luxury. The luxurious female body is the Sovereign Image and Boucher shows us an opulent image of the king’s mistress, who appears surrounded by all imaginable riches and luxuries, willing, like France, to satisfy the absolute monarch’s wishes, whose body, as Foucault points out, was equivalent to that of the State.



François Boucher, *La toilette de Venus* (1751), Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

It is not a minor fact for psychoanalysis that the canon of beauty began as that of a masculine ideal and that it later moved toward the “beautiful sex.” There is both an artistic inclination toward the female body in the representation of beauty as the favorite and a shift in the gaze toward the male body. Just as the questioning of the Name of the Father has led different logics grouped in the so-called “feminization of the world” to become relevant (Miller & Laurent [2005]), the Sovereign Image of the male body shifts toward the female nude and opulence. From Apollo to Venus, elements of the divine now appear, as well as mundane products which do not respond to an orderly disposition, but which are intermingled, fallen, disordered, in promiscuity with deities, animals, things. Even in what appears to be the interior, one can also find an exterior by paying attention to the background of the image; there is a confusion between what is inside and outside. Order is questioned.

VENUS SUPPLANTED BY THE VAGINA

The nineteenth century, marked by the Industrial Revolution, nationalism, and colonialism, was extremely important in the consecration of the modern way of life. A century that witnessed opposing movements in its poetic/political motivations such as Neoclassicism, Romanticism, Realism, Impressionism, and Symbolism was also cut across by different conflicting political and scientific conceptions, mainly liberalism, socialism, and positivism.

In the junction of the latter, apparently so far apart from one other, lies Realism, a movement that was led in France by Gustave Courbet (1819-1877). Almost all art historians are familiar with one of his quotes, which sums up his artistic and political commitment: “Show me an angel and I will paint one.” For Courbet, a forerunner of the avant-garde, art should be at the service of reality and not submitted to any canon. This adherence to truth in art led him to explore themes which had been absent from his career, such as the lives of peasants and those who were marginalized from nineteenth-century progress (1973 [1981]). He did so with a fidelity that owes much to technological advances, as one might wonder whether he could have developed—as Degas did, for example—without the invention of photography.

The Sovereign Image in Courbet’s work is life itself, without bourgeois humanist idealizations. His best-known painting, “A Burial at Ornans,” is often compared in this sense with El Greco’s “The Burial of the Count of Orgaz” (1588). Courbet offers a stark look of death. The center and the foreground of the scene are occupied by an open grave in a rural burial. A dog snoops nearby, downplaying the importance of the ceremony that is taking place under a leaden sky. To the left and right of the crudely dug hole in the ground are the clergy and the peasants. The composition is markedly horizontal, as if to highlight the impossibility of an “ascent.” In contrast, two and a half centuries earlier, the work of El Greco (1541-1614) was markedly vertical, where the soul of the deceased was detached from his body and ascended to heaven—certainly to that of the just. “The Origin of the World,” painted by Courbet in 1866, shows us a truncated image of a female body lying with the genitals exposed in the foreground. The crudeness of the image—especially considering the time when it was painted—can be thought of in the general context of the eminently anti-romantic proposal of Realism.



The Origin of the World (1866), Gustave Courbet, Musée d'Orsay, Paris, France.

It is remarkable that with the passage from the representation of the male body as a canon of beauty to that of the female body, Courbet's blunt questioning of the idea of canon produced a work showing, in the foreground, what had remained outside the gaze in the "beautiful female body": the vagina.

It is well known that Lacan had to cover this work, acquired for his country house, with a double-bottomed frame system which allowed it to be hidden or shown, as it made visitors very uneasy. The female body was the Sovereign Image, but on condition that her female genitals be kept veiled. That horror caused by the exposed vagina is an indication that the image might moor *jouissance*. It is an image which does not show bodily completeness, which is not oriented by the beauty of the female body. On the contrary, it strips the representation of the harmony which ensures contemplation and strikes a blow to the gaze. There is no ostentation or divinity; it removes adjectives from the body to simply show a vagina, a pair of thighs, a breast, and a navel flung on some seemingly white sheets. We cannot even see whether it is a dead or a living body.

As we said about "A Burial at Ornans," Courbet removes the transcendence that a funeral ritual can have in order to show death without a Paradise, without an ascent. There is a step which separates the verticality of the divine from the horizontality of the earthly. From the female body as an idealized whole to the pornographic fragment.

FROM PLAUSIBILITY TO HYPERREALISM: THE TRIUMPH OF SCIENCE

Ron Mueck (1958), an Australian sculptor, is known for the striking verisimilitude of his human and animal figures, stylistically and conceptually related to the Hyperrealism of the 1970s. Using scientific and technological resources, he achieves an extreme naturalism in his sculptures, which are always gigantic or tiny, bigger or smaller in comparison with the original model. None of his figures respect the real size of the human or animal body, although they do achieve a verisimilitude which produces a certain ominous feeling in the viewer.

Having worked for the film industry, Mueck does not choose to create supernatural or science fiction figures, despite the unlimited availability of special effects today. His sculptures allow the

viewer's eye to meddle in the almost microscopic details of the body, thanks to the instrumental use of scientific technology. The daily poses of his figures, thanks to which his work has become part of *costumbrismo*, do not express anything extraordinary, but rather turn the ordinary and frequent into something of extreme interest to the viewer. More or less like the gesture of Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968) who, by choosing an indifferent and ordinary industrial product for everyone, transforms it into a *ready-made* product worthy of exhibition.

His works show a moment of stoppage which does not refer to a clear past or future in the situations they represent, but they do show a gesture which occupies a time lapse. They are like three-dimensional photos taken in the middle of a minimal story which has begun and continues. Like a stopped film, they tell only what they show. In fact, there is no context enriching the story of the figure; there may be an object, a light put in some kind of perspective at best. Perhaps this is what makes them suggestive, disturbing, and attractive, in addition to—naturally—their hyperrealism.

The figure we have chosen to present here is “Dead Dad” (1996). It is a sculpture which uses the body of his own father as a model. He even used the original hair for the figure. This work is paradigmatic of Mueck's work. In addition to the obvious connection which can be made with the great philosophical and psychoanalytic theme of the dead Father, there are other reasons: one of them is that he used the image of his dead father to make the sculpture. The reuse of human corpse fragments is a unique feature of our times, made possible by science and the mandate to recycle. In addition, this is another one of his works which focuses on a body that is old and shaped by time and life. But this time it has been struck by death. His sculptures are known to have been branded as looking alive; this one only needs to be actually dead. “Dead Dad” does not represent the death of Christ or that of some saint or monarch, like so many horizontal sculptures that can be found in many temples. It is not about the death of God; there is no transcendence in this death; it is that of an ordinary citizen. Is death the impossible challenge for science?



Ron Mueck, Dead Dad, 1996.

We said that one effect of his work is that his sculptures seem to be alive, but there is another side effect that unsettles the viewer: it is the question of what a body really is; is it an image, is it the organs and bones, is it a shell, is it something living, is it an object? Mueck's bodies, in spite of being empty shells inside, exert a mirror fascination which does not appease, but rather leads to one's being reflected—reflecting on oneself—in that Sovereign Image.

Throughout the selection of works that we have looked at, the Sovereign Image has acquired predominance over different bodies according to the period.

From the body of the animal as a privileged Other to the right phallic measure of the homoerotic

body. Later on, from the voluptuous representation of the female body becoming the favorite to the bodily realism stripped of the beautiful ideal. Thus, we arrive at an art that puts the viewer's body in a state of questioning. The body proves to be an Sovereign Image in whatever format it is presented, always carrying that fascination which comes with its contemplation.

The art which we have seen here shows us a path indicating the attempt to represent otherness—animality, divinity, femininity, even death—the body being the support with which we try to capture it, to point it out as the Other of each epoch in a gesture aspiring to bring it to unity, to identity, opposite to otherness.

But there is something else: this Sovereign Image that produces fascination, fear, contemplation, rejection, or admiration; this Sovereign Image that is the body becomes an object stripped of its attributes of beauty and vitality in “Dead Dad.” This work seems to be shouting: After all, there's only waste left! But the image reigns.

REFERENCES

- **Boyme, A.** (1987 [1994]). *Historia social del arte moderno*. Madrid: Alianza.
- **Clark, K.** (1956 [1996]). *El desnudo*. Madrid: Alianza.
- **Clark, T. J.** (1973 [1981]). *Imagen del pueblo. Gustave Courbet y la Revolución de 1848*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili.
- **Foucault, M.** (1975 [1991]). *Vigilar y castigar*. México: Siglo XXI.
- **Freud, S.** (1936 [2008]). “Carta a Romain Rolland (Una perturbación del recuerdo en la Acrópolis)” en *Obras Completas. Tomo XXII*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
- **Giedion, S.** (1981 [1985]). *El presente eterno: los comienzos del arte*. Madrid: Alianza.
- **Miller, J.-A.** (1995 [1998]). “La imagen reina” en *Elucidación de Lacan. Charlas brasileñas*.
- **Miller, J.-A. y Laurent, E.** (2005). *El Otro que no existe y sus comités de ética*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- **Paton, J. & Storr, R.** (2013). *Ron Mueck*. Buenos Aires: Fundación Proa.

“I DON’T LIKE TO TALK ABOUT ART”

INTERVIEW WITH MARCOS LÓPEZ

Marcos López describes himself as an Andy Warhol of the underdeveloped world. In his work, he managed to eradicate the melancholy tonality of Latin American photography in order to bring us closer to a carnival of shots and stories where local identity comes into unprecedented prominence.

We wanted to invite him to write about the relationship between belief and image, as well as about those contemporary phenomena which have influenced his work. We also told him the words anxiety, sex, violence, body, and pornography so that he would give us his opinion about the images that are capable of moving us today.

When his text arrived, we decided to establish it according to the four statements inspired by the reading of Jacques Lacan’s *Seminar 23*. “A New imaginary,” the syntagma which inspires this issue of LAPSO and appears in the eighth class of that seminar, prompted us to give greater prominence to the images in López’s work which motivated our questions.

What follows is the result.

THE SUBTLETY OF THE SPIRIT

I think that in certain portraits of anonymous people or chance encounters during trips I can capture a deep gaze, a fraternity of souls in the encounter. The word “abandonment” comes to my mind. Soul mates. Something spiritual. A communion. I do few landscapes, but I’ve been going through all my photos since the eighties and there are some urban landscapes, spaces where I feel a spiritual presence. Something worth living for... I keep wondering what the point in doing things is...



ARTISTS MODEL THAT WHICH THEY IMPUTE TO GOD

Everything always happens for another reason. It's as if decisions were made by an "internal boss," God, a gnome. I can say I got bored of doing black and white photos in those days and I wanted to do photos with screaming colors and bagatelles to represent Menemism and do totally different photos, in Sebastião Salgado's Latin American style, or in the style of the great black and white photographers.



ON THE AFFECTED IMAGE

All my work represents my traumas, my inferiority complexes, my thirst for revenge, my repressions... everything's so obvious... Irony is a shield, a form of protection. I always speak about my melancholy mood; I'm moved every time I see a mattress lying on the street, aloe vera plants, certain 1960s car models, by-the-hour love hotels on the road; I'm always interested in the same list of topics. Now I'm interested in painting and drawing; I feel like taking up sculpture.

For me photography is like speaking and breathing, but I only use the mobile phone. I use cameras only for money; if I get paid for a photo, my assistants take care of it. The main thing in photography is that which is real and the passing of time. Digital technology is a pact with the devil. When I visit San Telmo street fair and go through a shoebox full of antique communion photos, I feel more moved—in a poetic, artistic, and emotional way—than by a great contemporary photography exhibition at the MALBA or the MOMA. I'm more and more anxious. We've become addicted. Everything's getting worse. When I wake up, before taking a leak, I check *Instagram*, *Facebook*, and *Gmail*. We're cyborgs, half-human and half-device. But I can be moved by a leaf in a puddle on a rainy day or on the cobblestones outside my front door. I get wet, put my feet in the water, take a snapshot of it with the phone, and upload it to *Instagram*. A phrase spoken by the cashier at the Chinese supermarket can leave me moved for three days.



ON DISRUPTING AND FOUNDING ART

I don't do much research on art. I don't like to read anything on art criticism or art history; I forget the names; I only know Warhol, Hockney, Lichtenstein. By this I mean my work is POP because it's national and popular—it can be read easily—and I include advertising brands such as Quilmes beer, for example. Hockney is one of today's greatest living artists, the use of color, the triviality of the topics... I don't like to talk about art.